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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Russia in a global context 
For Finland, Russia is the single most important state whose development has an impact on 
our external and internal security. In order to analyse the impact of Russia, its security 
thinking must be understood, as well as how it also seeks to further its security by 
transforming international structures. In the current international situation, the central 
challenges for Russian national security are economic growth, state structures and defence. 
These goals are supported by internal security and political stability, which is used as a 
means for establishing strong governmental leadership. 
 
In light of current knowledge, Russian foreign policy primarily follows a realist approach: in 
Russian security thinking, foreign policy is seen as involving concrete, strategic and tactical 
choices that are tied to time and place. In realist thinking furthering value-based (be it 
Western values or something else) policies plays an instrumental role in furthering realpolitik 
interests. Nevertheless, various integration goals are also central in Russian foreign policy, 
and their impact should be assessed in relation to contradictory tendencies in international 
relations (Rojansky 2014). In its foreign policy, Russia’s goal is to create a multipolar world 
system, in which it is one of the central great powers. Russia opposes Atlanticism and the 
military, economic and cultural hegemony of the United States of America. 
 
Despite the political crisis in international relations, both Finland and Russia have been a part 
of a global development in which transnational collaboration has sought to establish new 
kinds of regional security areas (Buzan 1991). During the last 20 years, increased trade, 
cooperation in the energy sector, cultural and educational exchanges and non-governmental 
organisations are seen to have built a solid foundation for bilateral and European Union–
Russia relationships. Cross-border cooperation between authorities in the EU countries and 
Russia has been an important cornerstone in internal security and environmental sector 
activities, among others. 
 
In regard to border security, Finland has been at the front line in developing national activities 
as well as activities in accordance with the EU’s four-tier border security model (Niemenkari 
2003; Heusala et al. 2008).
1
 Finland has thus built its relationship with Russia on a long term 
and broad societal basis. The governmental and judicial development of Russia have brought 
along cooperation opportunities as well as generating various new challenges and 
unintentional side effects. The tension between Russian foreign policy and internal Russian 
reforms (Gel’man 2015; Heusala 2013; Kulmala et al. 2014; Collier 2011; Skryzhevska
 
et al. 
2015) has had an impact on transnational collaboration, among other matters. In the 
interpretation of Russia, it is crucial to comprehend and analyse its intentions, resources and 
global preconditions (including judicial and other integration systems) in a balanced manner.  
The analytical focus lies with a realistic interpretation of post-Soviet institutional change 
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010). 
 
                                                     
1
 Collaboration within border security and judicial administration has been complemented by legislative 
and administrative harmonisation, as well as joint education and coordination activities.  
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Russian military build-up, military reform and changes in military thinking (Casapoglu 2015) 
have in recent years been reflected in its ability to advance its own geopolitical goals in its 
neighbouring areas. Foreign policy conflicts with the West – most recently, the EU – have led 
to a rupture in dialogue and a situation resembling economic war, particularly after the 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia. Russia challenges the judicial view of the 
international community that the incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula was unlawful. Russia 
has experienced the Eastern Partnership of the EU, which was initiated in 2009 as a part of 
Eastern Enlargement, as a challenge for its own integration goals in the former region of the 
Soviet Union. Within the European Union, on the other hand, the establishment of the 
Eurasian Economic Union has been seen to challenge the EU’s presence in the Southern 
Caucasus. (Palonkorpi 2015.) In the Ukrainian crisis, two integration processes seemed to 
transform into a battle of spheres of influence. The military and economic capacity of Russia 
and changes in its security thinking have also influenced stability in Northern Europe. The 
crisis has had a clear impact on the economic situation in Finland. The development cannot 
be observed only through individual sectors of the economy, and it is not fruitful to perceive 
Russia as an actor separate from the rest of the world. Its operational environment is global, 
and the choices which have an impact on Finland are influenced by decisions and events 
elsewhere. This is reflected in Russia’s own security policy documents and the objectives of 
the Russian government. The impact of the Ukrainian crisis can be seen in Russian foreign 
policy and in the growing tension in the Baltic Sea region. Simultaneously, the crisis has 
increased the importance of Russia’s relations with China. 
Finnish research on Russian security policy 
The consequences of the current political crisis will probably be long-lasting. It is therefore 
necessary to form a timely and comprehensive picture of the central development trends in 
Russia and examine what Finnish research, in particular, says about the development of 
Russia. This project analyses Finnish peer-reviewed fundamental research that can be 
positioned within Russian security policy research. The studied time period is 2011–2015. 
The project consists of two parts: 1) The state of Finnish research on Russian security policy, 
2) Developmental trends in Russian national security. 
 
Research on Russia has been the target of considerable investments in Finland. In addition 
to the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki, central academic actors include the 
University of Tampere, the University of Eastern Finland and Lappeenranta University of 
Technology. Other universities and universities of applied sciences have also run research 
projects related to Russia, and research interests have also been furthered by individual 
researchers. Sectoral research institutes produce topical policy analyses regarding Russia. In 
the field of Russian studies, the Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russian Studies – Choices of 
Russian Modernisation (2012–2017), funded by the Academy of Finland, has utilised 
international networks to make multidisciplinary openings, and has systematically 
strengthened existing lines in fundamental research. RussiaHUB Helsinki activities, 
coordinated by the Aleksanteri Institute, are an important means for increasing the societal 
impact of research. These activities seek to bring together actors interested in Russia in the 
corporate world of the Helsinki metropolitan area, public administration and the academic 
world. 
 
Overall, there is a lot of research knowledge in Finland related to Russia, but a qualitative 
synthesis of the focal points of this knowledge has thus far been absent. One of the 
objectives of this final report is to support the establishment of a more comprehensive 
strategy for Finnish research on Russian security policy, so that the funding of these activities 
can also lie on a more solid base. Our project has assessed the strengths of Finnish research 
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and identified areas that should be further developed in in order to ensure that the picture of 
Russia is timely and comprehensive enough and provides an expert interpretation of the 
overall development of Russia. 
Russian national security as the starting point 
The starting point for the project was the definition of Russian national security. The viewpoint 
and goals of Russia are defined in security strategies and policy documents, security 
legislation and the President’s annual keynote speeches.
2
 Decision-making is led by the 
President and the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF). As of the mid-2000s, 
the role of national security as a framework for political decision-making has grown stronger 
(Antonov 2012). Within national security, societal and state security encompass a broad 
range of issues that would be regarded as comprehensive security and internal security 
issues in Finland. According to Russia’s own definition, central focal points include, in 
particular, anti-terrorism, information security, regional, immigration, national and counter-
narcotics policy and border security. 
 
 
In this project, economic growth, the capacity of state structures and the development of 
national defence are highlighted as crucial factors shaping Russian national security. Within 
domestic policy, Russia supports these goals through its internal security objectives, and 
within its foreign policy, by establishing a multipolar system. The latter is connected to the 
aim of strengthening the political, economic and military latitude of Russia. This project 
recognises the actual interconnectedness of the different Russian policy segments as well as 
the complexity of change, where Russian choices are also being strongly affected by 
globalisation. 
 
 
Figure 1 Definition of Russian national security 
 
1.2 Materials, methods and authors 
Finnish research on Russian security policy 
In this project, the evaluation of Russian development was preceded by a meta-analysis of 
Finnish research, which examined the focal points, strengths and clear areas to be developed 
within Finnish research on, or related to, Russian security policy. The meta-analysis sought to 
                                                     
2
 The central decrees are: Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 31 декабря 2015 года N 683 
"О Стратегии национальной безопасности Российской Федерации"; федеральные закон от 28 
декабря 2010 г. N 390-ФЗ "О безопасности"; федеральные закон от 28 июня 2014 г. N 172-ФЗ "О 
стратегическом планировании в Российской Федерации".  
 National security in Russia 
Economic 
capacity  
Defence and 
defence-
industrial 
capacity  
 Internal security 
Societal security 
State security 
 External security 
Multipolar system 
Military 
balance  
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address the following questions: 1) In what respects does Finnish research reach a good 
international level? 2) What are the gaps in knowledge that Finnish researchers could fill 
themselves? 3) What kind of knowledge could be acquired or produced through good 
networks? 
 
The classification includes peer-reviewed studies on themes related to Russian security 
policy conducted during 2011–2015 in Finnish universities. The gathered material has been 
classified into categories, which help to illustrate the themes that have been studied most 
extensively in academic research. The conclusions also outline the human resources 
(research projects vs. permanent positions), methods and materials (multidisciplinary vs. 
approach derived from a specific discipline) used in Finnish research. 
Selection criteria for evaluated studies and research categories 
All Finnish universities
3
 are included in the categorised sample. The JUULI portal served as 
the primary reference service used for searching for peer-reviewed research and doctoral 
dissertations published in 2011–2014. For studies published in 2015, the publication portal of 
each university was used. The search terms were different forms of the word ‘Russia’ in 
different languages: russ*, venä*, rys*, русск* and росси*. From a total of 2,200 publications, 
461 were selected for more detailed categorisation. In addition to the publications’ titles and 
abstracts, key words were utilised in making the selection. The categorisation does therefore 
not represent disciplines, but all of the categories form a multidisciplinary whole. 
 
In selecting the publications, the most important criterion was a publication channel that was 
classified at level 1–3 in accordance with the JUFO classification of the Publication Forum.
4
 
In addition, the publication had to fit into the categories for peer-reviewed research 
recommended by the Ministry of Education and Culture and used by the Finnish Academy
5
: 
A1 article in a scientific journal, A2 review article in a scientific journal, A3 book section or 
chapter in research book, A4 conference proceedings, C1 scientific book, C2 edited book or 
anthology, conference proceedings or special issue of a journal. Of the works selected for the 
sample, a few publications were discarded in spite of their home university categorisation, 
since their publication channel was classified at JUFO level 0. However, the sample includes 
all doctoral dissertations published in 2011–2015, regardless of whether the dissertation was 
published in the university’s own institution series or as a separate scientific publication. 
 
The sample of this final report does not contain material produced as internal research work 
or reports for public authorities, nor publications published in non-peer-reviewed publication 
series of sectoral research institutes. Thus, the generated picture of peer-reviewed research 
in Finland does not correspond to the whole Finnish expertise or topical knowledge regarding 
themes that are central for Russian national security. The selection criteria for the sample has 
been guided by the will to examine the state of peer-reviewed academic fundamental 
research in the field of Russian security policy. 
 
The selected sample was further categorised according to thematic categories. The 
categorisation is based on Russia’s own definition of national security (see Figure 1). The 
Russian definition of security policy is comprehensive. Drawing from this notion, this report 
goes from the assumption that research on Russian security policy should encompass 
                                                     
3
 In addition, peer-reviewed work published in 2011–2015 by the researchers of the Finnish institute of 
International Affairs and the Finnish Defence Forces were included in the selection. 
4
 http://www.julkaisufoorumi.fi/ 
5
 https://confluence.csc.fi/display/tutki/OKM%3An+julkaisutyyppiluokitus 
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themes related to internal as well as external security and their concrete connections with 
one another. Accordingly, the understanding of security research utilised in this report is not 
limited to the disciplines traditionally associated with the topic, such as geopolitics, thematic 
fields within military science or foreign policy. Instead, the starting point has been that the 
basis, decision-making and execution of Russian security policy should be broadly 
approached through the themes that Russia includes in this policy segment.   
 
The Russian National Security Strategy published on 31 December 2015 has served as the 
central document for determining the categories. The strategy defines the policy sections 
encompassed in national security as well as presenting special focal areas. In addition, the 
need to examine the state of Finnish research on economic matters, armed forces and the 
military industry, in particular, was taken into account when formulating the categories. The 
special focal areas of Russian security policy and themes particularly important for the 
current world political situation have been given their own categories. Such themes are the 
Arctic, the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia and NATO, and armed conflicts. The categories 
also include those that influence Russian security policy decision-making and execution, such 
as government, authorities (including the Ministry of Defence) and law. Within domestic 
policy, non-governmental organisations and political movements have been given their own 
category. 
 
The final main categories of the research were as follows: 
 
1. Security policy, strategy and security thinking 
2. Armed forces (Military) 
3. Ministry of defence 
4. Military strategy 
5. Military leadership 
6. Military economy 
7. Russia and NATO 
8. Military conflicts 
9. Business and national economy 
10. Oil and gas industry, energy 
11. Eurasian Economic Union 
12. Arctic 
13. Environmental policy 
14. Foreign policy 
15. Geopolitics 
16. Law 
17. Government, authorities, politics 
18. State and societal security: 
 regional policy, welfare policy, border security, immigration policy, counter-
narcotics policy, anti-extremism policy, nationalities policy 
19. Anti-terrorism action 
20. Information security 
21. Transportation 
22. Culture 
23. Education 
24. NGOs and political movements 
 
When compiling the final report, each of these categories has been divided into smaller 
sections. For larger groups, in particular, this provided a means for examining how research 
has been focused not only thematically, but also according to the publication channel. During 
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the project, the gathered data was publicly available on the project’s website 
(http://blogs.helsinki.fi/venajankehitys/data/). 
Evaluation of development trends in Russian national security 
The methodology in the second section of this report was primarily based on a qualitative and 
participatory approach. The new material was produced during two four-hour workshops in 
May 2016. The analysis and conclusions of the final report are based on the workshop 
material, which has been categorised in accordance with the Russian definition of national 
security (Figure 1, p. 9). Eight academic experts and two experts at the Ministry of Defence 
participated in the workshops. 
 
Workshop 1 evaluated the economy, defence and foreign policy. The targets of evaluation 
were: 
 the development of military capacity and the modernisation of the military 
economy, 
 Russia’s activities in regard to the EU, the Eurasian Economic Union, the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Central Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation, and China, 
 Russia’s energy economy, and 
 the development of the Arctic. 
 
Workshop 2 evaluated the internal development of Russia. The targets of evaluation were: 
 regional policy, 
 demographic development and migration, 
 activities against serious transnational crime and terrorism, 
 the development of political decision-making, 
 information security, 
 the reform of public administration, and 
 legal development. 
 
Based on their existing knowledge, the workshop participants outlined Russian development 
trends by addressing the following questions: 
 
• What are Russia’s goals, means (resources) and capacities (political and 
administrative performance) in defence and economic matters? 
 
• What are Russia’s goals, means (resources) and capacities (political and 
administrative performance) in societal and state security? 
 
• What is their meaning for Finland’s choices? 
 
In the workshops, the main questions of the project were reflected against Russian economic 
development. The workshops utilised the Russia Statistics of the Bank of Finland Institute for 
Economies in Transition.
6
 In addition, the working groups took into account the evaluation 
indicators presented in the Russian Security Strategy.
7
 The indicators include the personal 
safety of citizens, share of modern arms and technology in the Russian armed forces, life 
expectancy, GDP, share of the poorest and wealthiest population of the total population, 
                                                     
6
 http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit/seuranta/venajatilastot/Pages/default.aspx 
7
 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 31 декабря 2015 года N 683 "О Стратегии 
национальной безопасности Российской Федерации". 
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inflation, unemployment, GDP share of research, technology, education and culture, 
geographical distribution and scope of environmental problems.  
In other words, the work was based on a meta-analysis of the current central developmental 
trends of Russian national security. The report highlights both internal and external security 
issues that the experts participating in the workshops recognised as central issues 
influencing Russian choices and actions. The highlighted development trends were also 
evaluated in regard to how predictable, intended and welcome (Perri 2010) they were from 
the Finnish perspective. The experts outlined a summary of their conversations in the form of 
a matrix. The second section of the final report, Development of Russia’s national security, is 
based on these discussions. The final analysis has been complemented with previous 
research results, from which some direct quotes have also been selected for this report. 
Authors 
Professor Markku Kivinen, Director of the Aleksanteri Institute, acted as the administrative 
leader of the project. Senior Researcher, Docent Anna-Liisa Heusala acted as the academic 
principal investigator. Her responsibilities and duties included the project’s research plan, the 
categorisation criteria for the Finnish research, acting as the chair at the workshops and 
drafting the final report. Information specialist Emilia Pyykönen at the Aleksanteri Institute 
was a central figure in the meta-analysis of Finnish research, as she conducted the basic 
categorisation and selection from the 2,200 publications retrieved from the databases of 
Finnish universities. 
 
The experts at the workshops examining the development of Russian national security 
represented broad expertise in the fields central for evaluating Russian national security. In 
addition to Markku Kivinen and chair Anna-Liisa Heusala, the workshops were attended by 
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The steering group of the project included Docent Kari Laitinen, Director of Research at the 
Ministry of Defence, who acted as chair, and Charlotta Collén, Senior Advisor for Research at 
the Ministry of Defence, who acted as secretary. The steering group members were Doctor of 
Military Sciences, Docent, Lt. Col. Petteri Lalu from the Finnish Defence Research Agency, 
Lt. Col. Pentti Forsström from the National Defence University, Doctor of Laws Jarmo 
Koistinen from the National Bureau of Investigation, Doctor of Social Sciences, Docent Jyrki 
Raitasalo from the Ministry of Defence, Mari Jaakkola from the Finnish Border Guard, 
Eevamari Laaksonen from the Ministry of Defence, Sami Wacklin from the Ministry of Foreign 
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Katarine Lindstedt from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The steering group convened twice. 
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2. FINNISH RESEARCH ON RUSSIAN SECURITY 
POLICY 2011–2015 
The project sought to map how studies conducted in Finnish universities in 2011–2015 is 
related to different categories of public policy in accordance with the definition of Russian 
national security. The selection is comprised of 461 publications that fit the classification of 
peer-reviewed scientific publications used by the Ministry of Education and Culture (see 
page 10). The aim was to identify the strong themes within Finnish research, as well as those 
themes relevant for Russian development where there is a need to develop Finnish expertise, 
and the themes that require good international networks. The significance of the less-
researched themes for the monitoring and interpretation of Russian security policy was also 
evaluated in the steering group. 
2.1 Quantitative distribution of the research themes 
Extensively researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–20158 
 
 
 
Quantitatively speaking, Finnish research has mostly been focused on the disciplines of 
business, foreign policy and geopolitics. Within the field of economics, research has 
concentrated on issues related to business activities, whereas research related to the 
national economy has been scarce. In the foreign policy and geopolitics group, the number of 
studies classified as geopolitics research totalled 29. In the group dealing with societal and 
political matters, a significant number of works dealt with regional policy, nationality policy 
and welfare. State-related research was defined as research dealing on some level with state 
governance, administrative decision-making or their consequences. The sample also 
included studies that examined the decision-making and execution of a specific governmental 
sector. 
                                                     
8
 The publications fit the following categories: A1 article in a scientific journal, A2 review article in a 
scientific journal, A3 book section or chapter in research book, A4 conference proceedings, C1 scientific 
book, C2 edited book or anthology, conference proceedings or special issue of a journal. In addition, the 
report examined dissertations separately.  
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In our sample, cultural studies were the most diverse in terms of disciplines and themes. 
Russian identity politics and historical perspectives on contemporary life in Russia stood out 
as specific themes. Within environmental research, notable themes included the Russian 
energy industry and forestry, the social responsibility of enterprises and the impact of climate 
change. 
Medium-researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015 
 
A total of 226 studies dealt with topics related to Russia’s internal development, such as law, 
education, welfare policy, politics, regional policy, civil society, the state and administration. 
With research dealing with culture and environmental issues, the total amounts to 343 studies 
in a five-year period. From this perspective, it can be concluded that there is a large amount 
of research in Finland dealing with matters related to Russia’s internal development. 
 
However, the evaluation also has to take into account the precise thematic focus of the 
studies. Particularly with studies regarding law and state/administration, which are relevant to 
Finnish–Russian cooperation, it is important to determine the extent to which disciplinary 
concepts and approaches have been utilized. A more detailed grouping also reveals 
interesting blind spots in other categories. One of the most striking deficiencies was the lack 
of research dealing with Islam, the Orthodox Church and faith. 
  
Little-researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015 
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Information security  (19)
Regional armed conflicts (17)
Media  (11)
Transportation  (11)
Security strategy and security
thinking  (9)
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In addition to broadly researched themes, the key goal of the project was to see which 
themes related to the definition of Russian national security are less researched. Such 
thematic areas were indeed numerous. Relatively little-researched themes included 
information security, transportation and media, among others. Studies of armed conflicts 
involving Russia are also scarce, even though studies on foreign policy and geopolitics form 
a large group in Finnish research. There are also only a small number of studies on security 
strategic thinking, and not one comprehensive study on the topic was published in 
international publication channels by the end of 2015. 
Rarely researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015 
 
There were several blind spots, and all of which are central for the monitoring and 
interpretation of Russian national security. Blind spots are defined as research areas that 
include only a few works during the entire observation period. Peer-reviewed research on the 
Russian armed forces is practically only taking its first steps in Finland. Despite the volume of 
foreign policy and geopolitics research, there are only a handful of studies on the Eurasian 
Economic Union, border security, immigration and the Russian security authorities. Perhaps 
one of the most startling gaps in research conducted in Finland was the lack of research on 
Russian terrorism. The lack of peer-reviewed research within the field of border security 
reflects the tendency of Finnish research to focus on more practical, policy relevant studies 
and dissertations published in universities’ own departmental series. 
2.2 Economy and the armed forces 
Research on economy is almost completely focused on Russian trade and the development 
of the business environment. Research dealing with business issues and the business 
environment include case studies within different sectors and studies on foreign investments. 
Among the Finnish universities, Lappeenranta University of Technology, in particular, has 
specialised in research on Russian business. 
Among the sample of studies, there is no work dealing solely with the national economy, but 
there are some studies on general economic policy during the observed period. However, 
there is no systematic academic research in Finland on this topic that is fundamentally 
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important for Russian security development. This is a rather significant shortcoming when 
attempting to evaluate the execution of state reforms and defence economy in Russia, for 
instance. 
Finnish research on the diversification of economy has generated a good understanding of 
the direction of the economy, particularly in specific fields such as the energy economy. In 
general, Finnish energy-related research is strong, and this is an important theme for Finland. 
Publishing is based on the works of a few researchers, and it has benefited from the ongoing 
Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russian Studies, funded by the Academy of Finland (2012–
2017). However, regarding a comprehensive and comparative examination of the national 
economy, even these well-represented themes do not eliminate the need to invest in 
academic publishing within the field of national economy. 
In Finnish research, the armed forces are a central blind spot. This goes for the military 
economy as well as military leadership and military strategies. The first Finnish dissertation 
on military strategies was published at the National Defence University in 2014. In the future, 
research on the changes in the armed forces would benefit significantly from studies dealing 
with security thinking, security legislation and the security authorities. Research on Russian 
reforms utilizing also empirical methods and comparable theoretical concepts would support 
the formation of a comprehensive picture of the conditions for decision making in Russian 
government. 
2.3 Internal security 
In principle, Finnish research on Russian internal security is sufficient in quantitative terms.   
Law, environmental issues, culture, state and politics, for instance, are well-represented 
areas. However, it is a closer look at the actual thematic focus in this category is also 
needed.   
In accordance with the Russian security policy definition, central subcategories for state and 
societal security include welfare policy and regional policy, which have been reasonably well 
studied in Finland. Politics, non-governmental organisations and political movements are 
likewise fairly well researched. However, all of these themes rely heavily on a few 
researchers. On the other hand, research groups have been established around these 
themes, and these researchers are devoted to their own area of expertise and their academic 
careers. Regarding studies on Russian politics, the production of international monographs, 
the lack of which was deemed problematic in the previous research review (Pursiainen 2013), 
has gained momentum during the observed period. 
Within cultural studies, research on religion and religious communities has been scarce 
during the studied period. For instance, studies on Islam have been published only as of 
2016, which illustrates how this is a budding research theme in Finland. Only one researcher 
is focused on Russian Islamic communities, and research on the Orthodox Church and 
religion also relies on a small group of researchers. 
Within research on law, the majority of the works are case studies related to various 
interactions between the judicial system and the surrounding society. There were only a few 
more traditional legal dogmatic analyses in the sample. The most central blind spot is 
systematic research on Russian criminal law and criminal procedural law, even though such 
research would be of great use in Finnish–Russian border security cooperation. Regarding 
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Russian criminal law, only one doctoral dissertation and one peer-reviewed article dealing 
with the topic have been published. Poor knowledge of this theme will pose a significant 
future challenge, as it is impossible to understand the deep structures of Russian internal 
security and security thinking in general without an understanding of the legal dimension. 
Research on the Russian security authorities undeniably needs to be complemented with 
legal examination. 
Regarding civil law, themes related to the development of the business environment are 
particularly well-represented, and there are also some studies on family law. Some studies 
related to environmental law have also been conducted, some of them dealing with the 
situation of ethnic minorities. Studies on the Russian judiciary seem to be a completely 
missing theme within the studies in the sample. This can be considered surprising, as various 
public appraisals regarding Russia’s internal development repeatedly emphasise the 
permanence of the problems within the Russian judicial system and the unreliability of its 
activities. Based on our sample, it seems that these conceptions are not based on Finnish 
empirical research. 
The category of research on Russian government and administration contains over twenty 
studies whose primary or important research theme seems to be the Russian decision-
making process and management, legislative changes, the execution of decisions or the 
interaction between citizens and the government. However, only a few dealt with 
governmental reforms as a whole or general changes within the Russian public sector. There 
were no comprehensive studies on Russian governance written with an approach and 
concepts derived from governance and administrative sciences research. Systematic and 
comparative research on Russian public administration is indeed a clear blind spot in Finnish 
research. This can be considered problematic from the point of view of both Finland’s own 
economic interests and the balanced examination of changes in Russia. In light of current 
research, the understanding of developments of the Russian state, its legislative work, policy 
making and implementation is incomplete, and expertise is in some respect insufficient. 
Within internal security, there are a number of themes that are dealt with in only in a couple of 
studies. These themes are border security, immigration policy, counter-narcotics activities, 
and terrorism and antiterrorism. The lack of research on financial crime, both in the form of 
criminological studies and as a theme of criminal law, can be deemed a major deficiency. 
Russian corruption is broadly discussed as an explaining factor, but there are no comparative 
analyses of this topic in terms of concepts and terminology or empirical data. Likewise, a 
shortcoming of international studies is that corruption is not approached as a comparable 
financial crime, but the concept is used for explaining the special characteristics of the 
Russian political system, often at a generalising level. The connection between Russian 
cybercrime and financial crime is also a clear transnational security challenge. At present, 
there is no Finnish academic expertise on these matters. 
There is a lack of peer-reviewed research on border security – including research on 
transnational crime and terrorism. This is a thematic area in which Finland has its own 
interest to strengthen academic research in the future. It is rather astounding how these 
themes are disregarded in studies related to Russian internal security. This could suggest 
that they are deemed difficult to research for academic researchers with a civilian 
background. 
Transnational, in practice global, security threats, such as various forms of criminality 
(including cybercrime), social challenges related to migration and themes related to 
  
 19 
 
antiterrorism are thus a clear blind spot in Finnish research on internal security. Research on 
the structures, management and activities of the Russian security authorities is a thematic 
area that should be given more international academic attention. There is specifically a need 
for analyses that use comparable concepts and terminology and avoid unverified political 
interpretations. 
During the recent European refugee crisis, a need has arisen for more knowledge on Russian 
border security development, the activities of authorities and the immigration and refugee 
situation. Research on immigration policy has only recently begun in Finland, and the sample 
includes only a couple of studies related to issues within this theme. 
2.4 External security 
Among peer-reviewed articles and edited books categorised in the field of foreign policy and 
geopolitics, ten specifically dealt with Russia’s own foreign policy strategy as a whole – in 
other words, not the bilateral relationship of Russia and another party, another country’s 
Russia-policy or some sector related to Russian foreign policy, such as the energy. A much-
researched theme during the studied period was energy policy. Russia’s relationship with 
Europe and the whole EU has also been rather extensively researched. A comprehensive 
examination of Russia’s own foreign policy is thus not a thoroughly researched area, even 
though foreign policy and geopolitics are generally speaking among the central themes in 
Finnish research. The majority of studies are focused on temporal or thematic cases. 
In regard to more comprehensive security thinking, there were only a few published studies 
during the studied period, of which most are focused on a specific area of Russian security 
policy and its implementation. The category also contains publications that present 
administrative or legal factors contributing to security thinking. During the studied period, no 
international comprehensive studies on the foundation or changes of Russia’s own 
comprehensive security thinking were published. This can be considered a shortcoming, 
considering the attention given in Western discussions to explanations of Russian security 
policy activities. 
Within the category of foreign policy and geopolitics, a total of 41 peer-reviewed articles were 
published. Slightly under half of them could also be classified as disciplinary works 
(international relations, world politics). The remaining studies represent multidisciplinary 
research or studies that cannot be labelled as international relations research. Of the 
publications in foreign policy and geopolitics, the majority were articles in peer-reviewed and 
edited volumes. During the studied period, there were 34 such works, of which roughly a third 
can be grouped according to their discipline based on the author’s background and theme. 
Thirteen international edited volumes were also published in Finland. Their themes varied 
from historical analyses to works on energy, regions neighbouring Russia and Russia–EU 
relations. Within the latter theme, a total of five international volumes with contributions from 
several authors were published. 
Russian relations with the United States, China, Central Asian states and Japan could be 
identified as a blind spot in research conducted in Finland. Finnish research has focused on 
EU–Russia relations, which in the future will not be sufficient for explaining Russian activities 
on the global level where it aims to promote its strategies. Investing in maintaining good 
networks and the establishment of new ones within these themes is a potential prospect. 
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2.5 Doctoral dissertations published in Finland 2011–2015 
 
Our sample included a total of twenty doctoral dissertations, of which twelve were 
monographs and eight article-based dissertations. Five of the dissertations were written in 
Finnish. The illustration represents all of the categories in which each dissertation was 
classified in the primary categorisation. 
In the category of regional and welfare policy, three works dealt with social policy, one with 
changes in industrial cities, one with environmental policy in the northern areas of Russia, 
and one with the language policies of Finno-Ugric republics. Within foreign policy and 
geopolitics, two dissertations discussed spheres of interest and geopolitical thinking, and one 
dissertation focused solely on Russian foreign policy. The category of culture includes one 
dissertation about religion, one about media and one about business culture. Legal 
dissertations included research on civil law, comparative research on Russian criminal law 
and legal sociological research on the practices of defending human rights. 
In terms of themes, Finnish dissertation work is versatile. Many of the dissertations are based 
on empirical work, which means that Finnish researchers have also gathered material in 
Russia as part of longer research projects. This has contributed to the researchers’ extensive 
knowledge base and the collected material can also be used in various further studies. 
Among the dissertations, there are also topics that belong to less-researched areas in 
Finland. Such topics include Russian military strategy, spheres of influence and criminal law. 
However, some of the researchers are not focused on becoming professional researchers, 
which means that further research on these themes will possibly not be advanced in near 
future without separate investments in them.  
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2.6 Strategic development of research on Russian security 
policy 
Many themes of Russian national security have received insufficient attention in research 
conducted in Finland. Among the missing and scarcely studied themes are the security 
authorities and security governance, border security, immigration policy, the Russian military 
economy, the armed forces as a whole, crime prevention and antiterrorism actions, Russian 
law, religions and religious communities. Russian law, policy making and policy 
implementation are also still quite poorly known. Within studies of foreign policy and 
geopolitics, Russia’s relations with Asia and the United States have not been studied in 
Finland, which leads to a Europe-centred examination of the current spheres of influence. 
In the future, themes that have so far been rarely researched should be approached from 
various disciplines, as these themes are often linked to each other.  For instance, border 
security is related to the security authorities and law, as well as transnational crime, terrorism 
and immigration policy. Research on terrorism, for its part, requires in-depth knowledge on 
the activities of the Russian authorities, regional conflicts and economic development in 
Russia’s neighbouring areas, as well as religions and religious communities. In addition, 
Russian immigration, social and labour policies and transnational crime (most notably drug-
related crime and financial crime in funding terrorism) need to be taken into account. In 
addition, cybercrime is also related to the above-mentioned themes. In this context it should 
be highlighted that research on financial crimes, from a criminological perspective, in 
particular, is a missing thematic area. This is in general a problem in international peer-
reviewed research. Research on Russian religious life has likewise been scarce in Finland, 
and this research within religious science is a clear shortcoming, considering how Russia 
currently stresses its traditional values. 
In the area of information security, media research has generated surprisingly few peer-
reviewed studies, even though the state of the media and its impact on Russian politics is a 
constant topic of discussion. A comprehensive study on, e.g., the change of media legislation 
is also missing in legal research, which in general is only rarely comparative or focused on 
legal dogmatic issues. There is thus clearly a need for a strategy regarding research on 
Russian law. 
Finnish research on the armed forces has so far relied on non-peer-reviewed studies or 
reviews. The examination of Russian economic goals could benefit from studies dealing with 
the armed forces, as is also shown in the second section of this report. In addition, the 
development of the Russian administration and authorities, and an in-depth observation and 
comparison of the related legislation should also be taken into account in studying the armed 
forces. 
There were only a handful of comparative studies in the sample of research publications. In 
the study of Russian security policy, comparison is undoubtedly necessary for concrete 
understanding of changes and their proportions. Currently, researchers often take so-called 
general understandings of the nature or change of Russia as their starting point without 
independently examining the basis of these notions and testing them empirically. From the 
perspective of strategic decision-making, research conducted from such premises only 
partially addresses the issue of the development of Russia and its significance for Finland. 
Conceptions can also be heavily loaded. Comparison of Russia with both the United States 
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and China is missing completely, which is problematic. A Sino–Russian comparison would be 
central to examine reforms in public administration, economy, defence policy and legislation. 
Based on what has been presented above, the development of deeper academic expertise 
requires long-term planning and the establishment and maintenance of well-funded research 
groups. Short-term projects can primarily produce limited reviews of various themes related 
to security policy. It is questionable how productive such scattered funding is, compared to 
sufficiently comprehensive funding which guarantees the development of ambitious and long-
term academic expertise. Academic visibility, including an increase in citations, is hard to 
reach if research groups cannot focus on building genuinely internationally relevant expertise 
and producing publications for important publishing channels. In order to avoid internationally 
saturated themes and bulk production, future endeavours should concentrate on strategically 
central themes with a medium- and long-term focus. With the help of good networks, this 
knowledge can be complemented with short-term projects related to topical issues. 
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3. DEVELOPMENT TRENDS OF RUSSIA’S 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
The purpose of our project was to establish what the most central Russian development 
trends are, and examine what these potentially mean for Finland. The development trends of 
Russian national security were considered in two international workshops on 17–18 May 
2016. The workshops were based on specific themes and related questions, which were 
given to the participants in advance. In total, eight academic experts and two experts from the 
Ministry of Defence participated in the workshops. The thematic areas of developmental 
trends, which were defined beforehand, were based on the project’s research plan that 
utilised the definition of Russian national security. Accordingly, the central themes at the 
workshops were economy and defence as well as internal and external security. Workshop 1 
considered Russian economic, defence and foreign policy. Workshop 2 concentrated on 
internal development in Russia, particularly themes related to the development of decision-
making, state reform programmes, justice and internal security. 
In this section of the final report, we gather the results of the evaluation of the experts 
participating in the workshops.
9
 The analysis has been complemented with quotes from 
research publications and with on-going research. The section will begin by briefly outlining 
the concept of national security and its historical importance as the framework for decision-
making in the Russian state. Thereafter, it will set out the most central concluding 
observations from the workshops on the current goals of Russian national security, resources 
for implementation, ability to execute goals, and the impact of these from the perspective of 
Finland, in particular. 
National security as the framework for state policymaking in Russia 
The concept of national security emerged in official Russian state documents in 1881. At that 
point, it served primarily as a synonym for societal security, which supported the aspiration of 
Emperor Alexander III to solidify autocracy and traditionalism in state leadership. A more 
comprehensive notion of national security, encompassing societal and state security, was 
officially taken into use in 1934 (Malin 2007:1–2) as a crystallisation of the judicial and public 
policy foundation of Joseph Stalin’s leadership ideology. During the first two decades of the 
Soviet Union, the economic, political and judicial changes solidified the understanding that 
individual security was a part of state security. The foundation of state security, for its part, 
lay on a socialist planned economy, which was secured and steered by the established 
Soviet judicial culture. In other words, the justice system served political interests in 
accordance with the definitions of the decision-makers, and the constitution was not deemed 
                                                     
9 The experts participating in the working groups were Senior Researcher Anna-Liisa Heusala from the 
University of Helsinki, who also acted as chair, Professor Markku Kivinen from the University of 
Helsinki, Finland Distinguished Professor Vladimir Gelman from the European University at St. 
Petersburg and the University of Helsinki, Professor Pami Aaltop from the University of Tampere, 
Professor Tuomas Forsberg from the University of Tampere, Professor Marianna Muravyeva from the 
National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Senior Economist Heli Simola 
from the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, Researcher Anna Lowry from the 
University of Helsinki, Senior Advisor for Research Charlotta Collén from the Ministry of Defence, and 
Special Advisor Janne Helin from the Ministry of Defence. 
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to restrict legislative work. (Heusala 2015:104.) This historical background of security 
concepts and their implementation influences state management in the post-Soviet era. 
The comprehensiveness of contemporary Russian security policy is reflected in the 
contemporary distribution into governmental-judicial levels, which all include both domestic 
and foreign policy goals. These levels are state security (related to sovereignty and 
independence), security of administrative areas, security on a regional level, private security 
and the security of Russian citizens living abroad (Malin 2007: 1–2). The security strategy of 
2009
10
, which preceded the current security strategy that came into force on 31 December 
2015, can be considered as a document that compiled the challenges for post-Soviet era 
societal development. The strategy reflects the history of reforms in state structures and 
policies. As a result, national security is perceived as an umbrella concept, upon which public 
policy relies. While Russia has reformed governance in the 2000s in accordance with global 
liberal economic thinking, the goal of the state was nevertheless defined as securing the 
wellbeing of the individual. In practice, this can be interpreted as the state, i.e., the federal 
central government, defining the frame within which welfare policy is conducted. 
Central concepts in Russian security strategical thinking include national interests and 
national priorities. The former concept is primarily related to the political agenda, whereas the 
latter refers to governmental and administrative planning and implementation. In the 2009 
security strategy, the long-term national interests were defined as democratic order, 
economic competitiveness, constitutional order, regional unity and autonomy, and Russian 
position as a great power, which aims at strategic balance and a multipolar world order. 
National interests were seen to be being threatened by demographic changes, environmental 
problems, uncontrolled migration, drugs, arms and human trafficking, other forms of 
transnational crime, domestic and foreign unrest, and corruption. The implementation of the 
security policy was to be monitored through specific indicators, including unemployment, 
income inequality, increase in consumer prices, domestic and foreign debt, GDP share of 
health, education and culture expenses, amount of new armoury, equipment level of the 
personnel of the armed forces, and level of income. The attractiveness of the Russian armed 
forces was stressed as a specific social goal. (Heusala 2011.) 
 
In studying the development of Russian institutions, the National Security 
Strategy creates an important background against which the development can 
be reflected. The security strategy and the complementary Federal Law on 
Security are based on definitions in accordance with the concept of 
comprehensive security. The security law is a framework law, which is 
complemented by separate laws for various organisations. The security 
strategy is so comprehensive that it extends development goals to encompass 
the significant societal sectors and their basic premises. The goal is to define 
the direction of Russia. (Heusala 2011, Kokonaisturvallisuuskäsitteen 
käyttämisestä Venäjän turvallisuuspolitiikan tutkimuksessa.) 
 
The impact of the current international political and economic crisis can be seen in the 
reformed strategy of 2015
11
. The strategy constructs an image of a world where increased 
juxtaposition threatens Russia’s national interests. Russia is seen as a target on which 
foreign powers are focusing their activities in an attempt to undermine the Russian decision-
                                                     
10
 Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года, от 12 мая 2009 
года, N 537. 
11
 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 31 декабря 2015 года N 683 "О Стратегии 
национальной безопасности Российской Федерации". 
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making system and societal peace. Despite this image, the strategy emphasises the need to 
sustain opportunities for cooperation with the EU as well as the United States. In terms of 
defence policy, strengthening Russian defence and securing constitutional order, 
independence and regional unity are deemed as central national interests. National interests 
concerning internal development include national consensus, political and social balance, 
strengthening democratic institutions and cooperation with NGOs, developing quality of life, 
health and the demographic situation, protecting Russian culture and traditional spiritual 
values, and improving economic competitiveness. In addition to economic factors, 
strengthening Russia’s great power status and strategic balance can be deemed as Russia’s 
most central geopolitical goals. Newly introduced focal points include national unity and the 
protection of Russian culture and traditional spiritual values, which formalise the nationalistic 
domestic policy development of Russia. 
The historical permanence of the strategy´s socio-political nature is manifested in the 
indicators for monitoring implementation. The indicators include private security and the 
security of Russian citizens, share of modern armaments and technology in the armed forces, 
life expectancy, GDP, income inequality between the top and bottom 10 per cent, inflation, 
unemployment, GDP share of science, technology, education and culture, and the 
geographical distribution and scope of environmental problems. The addition of life 
expectancy into this list reflects a focus on reducing mortality, which has increased 
dramatically in the post-Soviet era, whereas increasing the birth rate has until now been a 
particularly important domestic policy goal. The inclusion of environmental problems as an 
indicator is probably related to the planning of regional policy. What is crucial about the 
indicators is that they refer to comprehensive security thinking and the overall functionality of 
society. 
3.1 Russian economic and defence policy 
Objectives and resources 
The goal of the development of the Russian economy is to reform planning in order to 
achieve more efficient implementation. The objective is to create a high-technology military 
economy, which will act as an engine for sustainable development and economic growth, as 
well as supporting the success of other public policy goals. Economic goals are intertwined 
with educational reforms and investing in critical research activities. The goal is to expand 
purely military technological development into civilian use (so-called dual-use), e.g., in 
shipbuilding, nuclear power, the aviation industry, space technology and the arms industry. 
The Arctic is geopolitically and economically central in Russia’s strategic thinking, and Russia 
also has long-term expectations for the Eurasian Economic Union. The goal is to ensure 
Russia’s interests in the north, both in terms of international law and presence of Russian 
authorities. Russia’s central defence policy goals are related to securing its independence, 
increasing its economic latitude as well as preventing the influence of neighbouring societies 
and terrorist action. Current resources are affected by the balancing between social 
responsibilities and state acquisitions required by the military economy. 
 
Means for economic development 
 
In 2014, 28 per cent of Russian state revenue and 51 per cent of the federal budget income 
were derived from oil and gas taxes. The share of the national economy of the entire Russian 
economy is currently around 38 per cent of expenses and just over 34 per cent of income. 
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The current crisis has forced a diversification of the economy through a programme for import 
substitution. The programme seeks to diminish reliance on imports, increase domestic 
production and diversify exports (Simola 2016). 
 
Economic policy resources have been developed by organising the Russian planning system 
and by enacting new laws. As of 2004, the Russian government has sought to stabilise the 
macro-economy and has drafted strategic programmes for various areas of the economy. 
The programme for import substitution, formulated in response to Western sanctions, can be 
considered as the latest strategic programme related to the economy 
 
The objectives of the current political leadership to strengthen the high-technology sectors 
commenced with the establishment of enterprises in the military industrial complex and in 
dual-use sectors. This was followed by shipbuilding and engine industry enterprises. A similar 
logic was also followed in establishing more complex multi-industry structures, which include 
Rosatom and Russian Technologies (subsequently renamed Rostec), among others (Pappe 
& Drankina 2008). Regarding these very capital-intensive companies, the goal has been to 
extend their scale in order to improve their international competitiveness and to support 
product development (Crane & Usanov 2010: 118). The expansion of state ownership in the 
above-mentioned sectors has attracted a fair amount of critique, but Russian leaders have 
constantly emphasised how the lack of initiative on the private sector has partially contributed 
to the development. President Putin has concluded that the objective has also been to 
prevent the degeneration of key knowledge areas in Russian human capital and to preserve 
scientific and production capacity (Putin 2012). 
 
Several complementary strategy documents
12
 and planning organisations have been 
established in order to improve the knowledge base, systematics and impact of economic 
planning. The foundation for the current strategic planning was born in 2009 through a law on 
the foundations of strategic planning and later through the Law “On Strategic Planning in the 
Russian Federation”, which the parliament passed in June 2014. A significant related 
legislative change was also the enactment of the law regarding industrial policy on 
31 December 2014 (488-FZ 2014). 
 
In October 2013, the Economic council was founded, which is a central decision-making 
organisation under the President. The council supports a number of economic strategies, 
from state-led stimulus to neoliberal economic policy (Ekspert 2016). The establishment of 
the council diminished the impact of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, whose purpose was 
to create a direct link between the authorities and business life and improve implementation 
(Monaghan 2014: 18). In June 2016, President Putin signed an order for the Council for 
Strategic Development and Priority Projects. Its purpose is to draft Russia’s development 
strategy together with the Economic Council (Ekspert 2016). 
 
The reform of the armed forces as part of the economic and defence policy 
 
At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, the accumulation of problems in traditional Russian high-
technology industries, such as defence and space technology, posed a challenge that 
required rapid rationalisation (Crane & Usanov 2010). The background for the reform of the 
Russian armed forces is the new, post-Soviet geopolitical and economic situation. Long-term 
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 Governmental programmes have been drawn up for all sectors of public policy, and are regularly 
updated. (https://programs.gov.ru/Portal/) Programmes related to economic policy include Strategy 
2010, Concept 2020 (a long-term socioeconomic planning concept until 2020), Strategy 2020 and the 
May Laws. 
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planning had to be discarded, as adaptation to the emerging market economy required 
reacting to urgent and accumulating issues (Päiväläinen 2016). The macroeconomic 
development in the 2000s enabled the reform of the Russian armed forces, which began in 
2008. The reform had been an objective as early as in the later days of Perestroika (Lannon 
2011). The reform is also based on a publicly expressed evaluation of the changing nature of 
war. The evaluation stresses regional tactical operations, as well as other forms than 
traditional warfare in accordance with so-called next-generation warfare
13
. Among the central 
objectives of the reform were a radical decrease in personnel and a restructuring of the 
administration (McDermott 2009). Personnel reduction was also related to the need to create 
alternative employment and build a more efficient defence order system. The modernisation 
of the Russian military industrial complex is thus nowadays not only aiming at reforming the 
armament and equipment of the armed forces, but at the comprehensive development of the 
entire Russian industrial system (Manturov 2013). 
 
According to the textbook of the Russian presidential government, global 
interests to be secured though the use of armed forces include resource-rich 
[geographical] areas, transportation routes and nodes. In lieu of 
straightforward occupation and use of force, it is recommendable to use 
indirect methods and to seek to persuade the opponent into cooperation, 
through either pressure or reflexive action. In the selection of armed 
measures, the strategy is to avoid losses and to take into account the 
interdependence of the fighting parties and the infrastructure’s susceptibility to 
destruction. Success requires fast action and precision of impact. Armaments, 
equipment, usability of forces and know-how need to support this, which is 
why the mass army is being replaced by professional armies. (Lalu & Puistola 
2016, Hybridisodankäynnin käsitteestä.) 
 
Only in 1996 was the first post-Soviet development programme for armed forces drawn up, 
for the years 1996–2005. A new feature was a GDP-based restriction on defence 
appropriation. Simultaneously, there was a shift back to budgetary appropriation based on 
the military branch and fighting arm. The chaotic environment of the transition economy made 
planning extremely challenging. The gathered experiences were, however, further processed 
into four development principles for the future: systematics, a realistic examination of needs 
and (particularly economic) opportunities, comprehensive knowledge management 
(knowledge-based centralised leadership), and constant management of the development 
programme (situation consciousness and flexibility in planning). Partially as a result of the 
crash of the rouble due to the monetary crisis of 1998, the need for economic and societal 
risk management was also recognised. The first risk management guidelines were drawn up 
in the early 2000s. (Päiväläinen 2016: 9–10.) 
 
During 2001–2010, the rearmaments programme for the armed forces proceeded to a new 
life span model, and the principle of iteration was also introduced into development 
(Päiväläinen 2016: 10). This refers to an engaging usage of expertise, constant testing of the 
functionality of reforms and phase-based development. In accordance with this new thinking, 
planning involved a larger number of military and political experts from various governmental 
areas, and funding was transformed into a three-level model. The goal was to prevent Russia 
                                                     
13
 See, e.g., Giles 2016. So-called next-generation warfare is also referred to as sixth-generation 
warfare, whose tactics also include hybrid warfare. In Russian military scientific and strategic 
terminology, a central concept related to warfare and hybrid warfare is reflexive steering (refleksivnoye 
upravleniye). Concisely put, this refers to the ability of party A to affect the thoughts and plans of 
party B, as well as party B’s image of party A, resulting in the solutions of party B being based on false 
knowledge. A similar, albeit narrower, US concept is perception management. (Thomas 2004: 242, 
250.) 
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from falling behind its most important rival countries, and the minimum goal was set at 
maintaining the existing system (Päiväläinen 2016: 10). 
 
In the 2010s, Russia concluded that the ideological juxtaposition had 
diminished, and instead, multi-polarity had gained ground; although on the one 
hand, the political, economic and military influence of specific states (state 
groups) had weakened. On the other hand, the increased influence of some 
states hampered the increase of the previously mentioned dominance. 
Globalisation was introduced as a new factor in world politics, which for its part 
led to increased competition in some fields and, respectively, increased 
tensions between different states and areas. Globalisation aggravated the 
complexity of international relations and the volatility of different developmental 
processes on both a global and regional level. However, in the mid-2010s, this 
was seen to lead to a redistribution of influential power in favour of new power 
centres. In this respect, Russia’s Military Doctrine 2014 sets a new strategic 
objective for superpower policy. (Forsström 2016, Venäjän sotilasdoktriinien 
kehittyminen Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen.) 
 
The current military industrial complex of Russia indeed appears as a strategic, half-
governmental security policy and technological actor (Päiväläinen 2016: 8). The armaments 
programme, which extends until 2020, is based on a broad normative foundation, which 
includes the National Security Strategy until 2020, the federal Military Doctrine, federal 
policies regarding the development of science and technology until 2010, and the concept of 
Russia’s socioeconomic development until 2020. (Burenok 2014; Kotov & Kozlanzhi 2012.) 
Russia has also thoroughly invested in the realisation of these defence policy goals. 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the share of 
military expenditure as a proportion of state expenses has steadily increased from 
9.9 per cent in 2008 to 13.7 per cent in 2015.
14
 The nominal increase of military expenditure 
in the national economy during 2007–2014 was 18 per cent, and still in 2015, the increase 
was as high as 28 per cent. In 2016, however, the increase of military expenditure has come 
to a halt. According to the estimate of the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in 
Transition, the GDP share of Russia’s military expenditure is around 3.5 per cent 
(Korhonen V. 2016). 
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 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex) The data on the military 
expenditure of different countries are derived from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic 
Outlook.  SIPRI has collected a database on the military expenditure of 171 countries since 1988. The 
database is based on public sources. 
*Compiled based on SIPRI’s Military Expenditure Database (2016). Chinese data is missing for the 
years 2010–2014. For 2015, the estimated share of military expenditure of the state expenditure of 
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According to SIPRI’s estimate, in 2015, the military budget of the entire world was 
1,676 billion dollars. The US share was 596 billion dollars, the share of China 215 billion 
dollars and the share of Russia 66.4 billion dollars. In 2015, the US’s share of the military 
expenditure of the entire world was 36 per cent, whereas the share of Russia was 4 per cent 
(Perlo-Freeman et al. 2016).
15
 However, no conclusions regarding the readiness of specific 
countries to defend their national interests in different situations of crisis can be drawn from 
these global power relations. In addition to the above-mentioned organisational and 
economic changes, the development goals of the Russian armed forces should be evaluated 
in relation to the United States and NATO. Some Russian political analysts harbour the 
conception that the United States is waging a war against Russia on different fronts without 
an open proclamation of war. The internal political pressure to reform the army and increase 
military preparedness is a motivator in President Putin’s current defence policy. (Crooke 
2016.) 
 
The Arctic 
 
The defence and development of industry are related to Russia’s activities in geographically 
central focal areas, of which the most important is the Arctic. Within the energy economy, 
Russia’s central goals are related to getting oil from Siberia and the Far East, diversifying its 
own production, opening up to international cooperation and the high-technology usage of 
nuclear power. In the Arctic, Russia is investing heavily in the activities of Rosneft and 
Gazprom. It seeks to develop infrastructure, reopen military areas and increase military 
capacity. The latter is in order to ensure a significant status in relation to NATO in the 
northern area. 
 
Russia has the world’s largest Arctic area, which encompasses a 17,500-kilometre coastline, 
a nine million-strong population and production whose share of GDP is significant. Russia 
has two central goals in the Arctic. The first is related to northern sea routes that might be 
profitable for Russia. In order to secure them, Russia demands the right to monitor sea areas 
which would normally within international law be considered areas of free navigation or 
territorial waters with free transit. The navigating rights are related to the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides coastal states with the sovereign right to 
the natural resources of the sea bottom within an exclusive economic zone, which extends to 
200 nautical miles from the coastline. However, it simultaneously also grants states the right 
to extend the width of this area by 150 nautical miles, if the geological limits of the continental 
shelf can be proven to extend to that area. Russia is claiming the majority of the 1.2-million-
square-kilometre area that extends to the North Pole. It was the first to deliver its petition to 
the UN Commission that had the task of establishing the limits of the continental shelf. The 
development of the Arctic is related to immense off-shore hydrocarbon reserves, which are 
estimated to represent up to 30 per cent of the world’s unutilised natural gas and 13 per cent 
of crude oil. (Flake 2015: 74.) Thus far Russia’s goals have been related specifically to 
securing the economic potential of the Arctic, in contrast to, for example, a ‘great geopolitical 
conflict’. Increasing tensions in the Arctic does not support Russia’s goals. At the same time, 
it can be seen that defending economic interests in the Arctic that are deemed nationally 
significant is taken seriously, for instance by developing administrative systems and by 
intertwining the interests with the reform process of the Russian armed forces. 
 
Policy announcements, budget allocations, and security developments 
connected to the Arctic since 2009 have largely centered on enhancing 
constabulary and conventional military capabilities. To this end, Moscow re-
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established units within the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk border guards to 
patrol the NSR in 2009 and set the goal of creating a comprehensive coastal 
defence infrastructure in the Arctic by 2017. [...] This infrastructure 
enhancement aligns with plans to deploy by 2020 a combined-arms force to 
include military, border, and coastal guard units to protect Russia’s economic 
and political interests in the Arctic. (Flake 2015, Forecasting Conflict in the 
Arctic: The Historical Context of Russia’s Security Intentions.) 
 
The Eurasian Economic Union 
 
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which officially started its activities at the beginning of 
2015, is the most ambitious of President Putin’s projects so far. The goal is to create a 
community based on the free mobility of capital, labour and goods that can compete in 
specific economic areas in the global market. Russia’s aim to achieve a strategically stronger 
position and resources in relation to the EU, which would also compensate for the problems 
of the Russian national economy, can be seen as the background for the development of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. The Eurasian Economic Union can also be seen as Russia’s 
attempt at strengthening its negotiation position in its cooperation with China. (Dutkiewicz 
2015: 6.) 
 
The historical background of the union is the integration of the former Soviet republic area, 
which began in the 1990s. This led to the Eurasian Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, which started its activities in 2010.
16
 In addition to the above-mentioned 
countries, the member states of the current Eurasian Economic Union also include Kirgizia 
and Armenia. Russia has emphasised that the goal is to establish a competitive economic 
and judicial integration, following the example of the EU.
17
 It has been flexible in regard to the 
goals of the other member states, which has made the union a form of ‘client community’, in 
which politics is as important as real economic interests (Kivinen 2016). Currently, the 
Eurasian Economic Union is governed through the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, 
consisting of the heads of the member states, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, the 
Eurasian Economic Commission and the Court of the EAEU. In the current economic crisis, 
the development resources of the Eurasian Economic Union have considerably diminished, 
but its foundation nevertheless holds a strong position, particularly in the field of energy 
production, in which it is among the globally leading producers of both oil and natural gas. 
Russia’s ability to achieve its goals 
Russia’s ability to implement its strategies for achieving its defence and economic objectives 
is currently considerably undermined. The comprehensive picture, however, is contradictory. 
The implementation of the ongoing policy for substituting imports is a lengthy process. The 
overall economic constraints are significant, as economic growth is estimated at 1–2 per cent. 
The price development of oil is a central short- and possibly also medium-term challenge, 
which complicates finding a balance between financing internal development and defence. 
Oil and gas taxes, i.e., oil and gas production taxes, as well as revenue from oil, oil product 
and gas import customs have decreased dramatically. In addition, the increase of the GDP 
share of military expenditure has stopped (Korhonen V. 2016). 
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 The political purposes of the project have been evaluated from various perspectives. Many 
assessments stress the geopolitical goals of Russia and its will to influence the development of the 
former Soviet states. The union is also associated with the Eurasian ideology. However, President Putin 
has so far emphasised pragmatic issues. (Kivinen 2016.)   
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In the future, Russia will continue to invest in its Arctic in terms of both military policy and 
global politics. The geopolitical importance of this area will increase if climate change 
proceeds according to expectations and the price of oil starts to rise. The military economy 
relies on state orders and exports, which thus far have been small. The military industry has 
the potential for development in a limited international market. However, the growth of the 
military economy will not necessarily proceed in accordance with Russia’s wishes due to, for 
example, high investments in shipping and missile production. The objective of dual-use is 
also challenging. 
 
Economic change 
 
Even though the price drop of oil, economic sanctions and the slow-down of the economy 
have diminished the Russian government’s resources for achieving its goals (Connolly & 
Hanson 2016: 18), they have simultaneously created strong incentives for Russia to change 
its economic model. Russia’s own economic experts are, however, divided on what will 
generate growth in the future. Some would opt for fiscal-political stimulus, some favour 
structural reforms, and others prefer monetary action by the central bank. (Papchenkova & 
Prokopenko 2016.) The struggle between these different lines is of course hampering the 
selection of the course of action. 
 
Industrial production has dropped since 2011, but in 2016, it has again shown signs of growth 
within the metal industry, machinery and equipment and the production of transport 
equipment. Researchers of economy are now pondering whether there might be a turn 
coming up in the Russian economy. However, due to the drop in wages, consumer trust is 
still low, and attracting solid investments is challenging. (Korhonen I. 2016.) At the moment, 
the sanctions are being felt hard in the energy industry, which is crucially important for 
Russia. Attracting investments in new sectors combined with the limitations for foreign 
investors has proved challenging, and renewable energy is having trouble entering the 
energy market. The development of liquefied natural gas and offshore opportunities is difficult 
for Russia. It has an increasing need to implement Western technology in the northern areas, 
where it is dependent on the activities of foreign enterprises. 
 
During the last decade, Russia has succeeded in the development of a civilian nuclear 
industry, among others, which is one of its internationally most successful fields (Crane & 
Usanov 2010: 108). In 2006–2011, Rosatom’s investments in research and development 
increased seven-fold (RBK Innovatsii 2015). Rosatom has also actively sought to increase its 
significance in foreign markets. In 2014, Rosatom’s foreign portfolio doubled to 100 billion 
dollars compared to 2012 (ITAR-TASS 2014). 
 
Resuscitating Russia’s civil aviation industry and shipping industry has been a more 
demanding challenge. Regarding these sectors, the Russian government’s operating policy 
has been to expedite progress by using the most successful part of military industry for 
launching civilian production (Hobson 2016). Despite the initial difficulties and slow progress, 
it would seem the Russian aviation industry is finally building up speed. The City Jet order, 
which landed Russian production in the European market, and the presentation of the engine 
type MC-21 can be named as examples (Hobson 2016; Zhang 2016). Initial state 
investments in the shipping industry also seem to have generated results. 
 
The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the enterprises in Russia’s military industry have been 
contradictory. At first, delivery of orders suffered because the Russian military industry was 
previously closely integrated with the Ukrainian military industry. The embargo on the export 
of arms from Ukraine to Russia hampered the acquisition of chopper engines and power 
sources used in naval ships, among others. It is hoped that the import substitution 
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programme will ease the situation for Ukrainian products within the embargo as soon as 
2017. Substituting Western products, on the other hands, is more problematic. (Connolly 
2016: 757.) There are, however, some success stories. The Russian pharmaceutical 
industry, for instance, increased by 26 per cent in 2015. A significant share of the new deals 
made during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2015 were within this sector. 
 
Economic growth and the ‘securitisation’ of leadership undeniably influence each other in 
Russia. Several estimates tend to believe the ‘securitisation’ of economic policy is hampering 
normal economic development. A negative view of Russia’s ability to reform its economy 
emphasises the system’s structural problems caused and maintained by its political nature, 
such as poor transparency in decision-making, corruption and quasi-reforms. Critics stress 
how the current import substitution programme is a conservative trend that undermines the 
liberalisation that has been achieved in Russian economic life. Others, however, doubt 
whether the neoliberal model – in its Russian form, in particular – is genuinely liberal, in the 
first place. (Taliano 2016; Titov 2016.) 
 
Russia’s ability to implement economic policy reforms can be studied through materialised 
examples. The analysis should be based on evaluations that are not too straightforward or 
based only on current assessments.  For instance, among the internationally praised Russian 
structural changes is the tax reform of 2000-2004, which generated a 13 per cent flat tax 
(Collier 2011; Gel’man & Starodubtsev 2014) and for its part supported the establishment of 
the stabilisation fund (Gel’man & Starodubtsev 2014). Subsequently, the modernisation of 
national economic planning has been underway, striving to combine annual budgeting with 
programme-based long-term planning. However, this reform has been more demanding to 
implement (Zhavoronkova 2014) than a one-off tax reform. 
 
What is noteworthy is that none of the economic policy trends that have gained support 
among Russian decision-makers are directly conflicting with international cooperation, direct 
foreign investments, technology exports or joint ventures with Western large-scale 
enterprises. The current substitution of imports does not translate into a negative attitude 
towards foreign investments in Russia, but includes an attempt to integrate foreign 
companies into the Russian market so that they transfer production to Russia rather than 
exporting to Russia. (Connolly & Hanson 2016.) The peak years of Russian competitiveness 
in energy prices were also significantly affected by increased wages, which can be seen to 
have diminished its advantage compared to other countries (Sutela 2012). After the 
establishment of the economic sanctions, the wage level has again dropped, which means 
reduced production costs from the perspective of foreign investors. 
 
Western analyses often stress the view that Russian economic policy is divided into those 
who wish to have ‘manual control throughout the economy’ and the liberal-technocrat elite 
that seeks to defend Russia’s development in a more modern direction and broader 
cooperation with the West (Connolly 2016: 770). However, in Russia, the differences in 
approach cannot be labelled according to simple categories, such as liberal economic policy 
versus state-led economic policy, or the economy versus security and bureaucracy (cf. Mau 
2016). It can be said, however, that competition between different economic policy 
perspectives is increasing. The situation can improve incentives to follow through existing 
reforms, if different economic and political interest groups can find objectives in them that 
they want to defend. 
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Military development 
 
Russia will respond to NATO’s missile defence project. The new missile system, which can 
penetrate possible missile defence systems (as in the case of Syria), developed new naval 
ships (also Syria) and nuclear defence, which is being developed further, have been at the 
centre of the development of the armed forces. Defence around Kaliningrad and Saint 
Petersburg will be important as well. The implementation of the rearmament programme is of 
course also affected by cuts in military expenditure, which are estimated to be up to 
6 per cent in 2016. Orders are expected to decrease by 5–7 per cent. According to the 
analysis of Pjankov (2015), from the very beginning, there has been a gap between the 
efficiency objectives and results in the rearmament programme, which extends until 2020. 
The main reasons are unclear military strategic, technical and war economic estimates, as 
well as the decision-makers’ poor knowledge of the true potential of the military-industrial 
complex. There has also been friction regarding the administration of the rearmament 
programme. Challenges are posed, e.g., a silo-like preparation process between different 
administrative areas, inadequate pricing systems, resistance to change within the 
administrative hierarchies and compatibility issues with foreign weapons systems (Burenok 
2012). 
 
Until recently, Russian leaders did not believe in a traditional military threat from the West, 
but this understanding has clearly changed. Operative-tactic Iskander-M missiles have 
already been introduced. These are short-range tactical weapons, which are meant to be 
able to destroy US and NATO military units and their equipment in Eastern Europe. The 
introduction of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile is also underway, which is meant 
as a response to the US Prompt Global Strike tactic. The strategic torpedo Status-6 is 
intended to target the US coast, when necessary, as well as the combat units of aircraft 
barriers and the US naval bases. 
 
Some military units have difficulties recruiting and committing personnel. Challenges related 
to personnel within the reform of the armed forces are also related to the reform of the 
Russian military service system. In principle, the military service system has been based on 
the duty of 18–27-year-old men to perform a year-long military service, thus ensuring a large 
reserve. Due to the shortness of the training of servicemen, they should not, in principle, 
participate in cross-border activities, which should be performed by professional soldiers, 
when necessary. In practice, there is no universal military service that would encompass all 
men, since conscription can be avoided on various grounds (Gresh 2011). However, during 
recent years, there has been increased investment in the training of regular soldiers, 
including more drills. All in all, the reform of the armed forces has been successful in the 
creation of more mobile troops, development of the speed, flexibility and automatisation of 
the decision-making system and the usage of new kinds of preparedness drills. Russia thus 
already has the will and high-level ability to use its military potential, in terms of both offence 
and defence. 
 
Russia’s interests in the Arctic 
 
In recent years, Russia has managed to solve long-term problems with its neighbours. The 
border treaty with Norway in 2010 finally calmed down one of the most significant bilateral 
disputes in the area. In 2013, Russia attended the long-awaited negotiations on the 
regulation of fishing in the central Arctic, which will significantly reduce the possibility of 
increased tension between various countries due to fishing rights. Other border-related 
disputes, such as the border between the United States and Russia on the Bering Strait, will 
probably not seriously aggravate tensions. The Arctic Council has managed to further 
common interests related to prospecting and oil destruction measures, which for their part 
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reduce conflict sensitivity. (Flake 2015: 74.) It would be in the interests of Russia to keep the 
area isolated from the ongoing crisis, even though it is increasing the resources of its 
authorities in the area. This seems to correspond with the interests of other actors, as well. 
The US, for instance, has not sought to militarise or create additional tension in the Arctic. 
 
The development of the Eurasian Economic Union 
 
The development of the Eurasian Economic Union faces numerous challenges even outside 
the current economic crisis. The first challenge is related to transnational decision-making, 
where Russia is easily seen to lead the entire economic union. Other countries might 
experience the asymmetric power relations in decision-making as a threat to their 
sovereignty, which will slow down integration in decision-making and implementation. 
Another challenge is related to the transnational, multi-layered (involving several societal 
sectors) integration, which is related to immigration, private enterprises and exceptions to 
customs legislation. The differences in the societal and economic situations between Russia 
and its neighbours are also significantly slowing down such integration. The third significant 
challenge is the ability of the member states to agree on the cultural, civilisation-related and 
religious nature of the union. This will require purposeful dialogue and the establishment of 
trust, which would serve as the foundation for all other cooperation. (Dutkiewicz 2015; 
Kangaspuro & Heusala 2017.) In the current economic and political crisis, there are 
necessarily no prerequisites for such rapprochement. 
Implications for Finland 
From the perspective of Finnish decision-makers, it is important to identify which 
development trends related to Russia’s military policy and economy should be followed, so 
that Finland’s own choices are not based on absolute evaluations or analyses of only the 
current situation. In interpreting indicators on Russia’s development, it is wise to seek to form 
a versatile, comprehensive and critical analysis, which also encompasses public discussion.  
At the moment, Russia does not experience Finland as a military threat, but Russian- Finnish 
relations are affected by Russia’s view regarding the expansion of NATO to its borders. 
According to Russia’s current security thinking, if Finland were to join NATO, this would 
create a security threat it could not bypass. Immediate political and economic reactions 
should be distinguished from an analysis of how NATO membership would affect Finland’s 
position in a war situation. In the case of increased tensions, Finland should be prepared for 
various developmental courses and be flexible and quick in its own actions. Improving 
Finland’s own flexibility would also mean increased defence and internal security 
expenditure. 
The modernisation of the Russian military economy does not have direct implications for the 
Finnish economy, but if Russia succeeds at reforming its central economic sectors, this will 
have an impact on Finland’s competitive environment. However, it is possible that the 
substitution of imports may already be affecting Finnish high-technology companies, even 
though the volume of such exports is low. Sanctions also affect Finland’s possibilities of 
importing armaments from Russia. In general, the Western sanctions significantly limit 
international cooperation in the military, energy economy and financing sectors. 
Modernisation objectives are hampered and slowed down, as there are limited opportunities 
for attracting financing from foreign creditors. 
Russia’s current tactical options also include, when necessary, undermining the unity of the 
EU–NATO collaboration, even though Russia is simultaneously seeking to enter into and 
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maintain cooperation with EU member states. From Finland’s perspective, it is important to 
maintain the possibility of continuing economic collaboration, particularly if or when the 
current crisis eases. The development of the Eurasian Economic Union must also be kept in 
mind. Current international research as well as political analysis emphasises Russia’s 
securitised and diminishing national economy (Connolly & Hanson 2016: 18), but relations 
with Russia built on this view might also lead to opportunities going unnoticed. Perceiving 
Russian economic development deterministically, for instance solely as increasing isolation, 
the growing role of the state in the economy or the ‘revival of Soviet economics’ (Åslund 
2013) can lead to misjudgements and surprises. Studies show that the industrial structures of 
Finland and Russia are very different, which increases possibilities for cooperation. The 
competitive advantages of Finland are centred on global technology companies, whereas 
Russia is focused on energy- and natural resource-intensive factory industries. 
Arctic climate change has provided new urgency for states to promote their 
interest. Following record low ice extent in 2007, the region experienced even 
greater decline in 2012, with the summer ice coverage measuring just 
3.41 million square kilometers, compared to a 7 million square kilometer 
average from 1979 to 2000. [..] The length of the ice-free season in the 
Russian Arctic seas has increased from 84 in 1979 to 129 in 2006 and then 
171 in 2007, allowing for greater maritime surface traffic as well as energy 
exploration work. (Flake 2015, Forecasting Conflict in the Arctic: The Historical 
Context of Russia’s Security Intentions.) 
 
In the cooperation against climate change, it is important to keep research and technology 
collaboration on the political agenda as well as striving towards practical collaboration. 
For Finland, monitoring the Arctic development is a permanent interest, since if oil prices 
increase, Arctic energy projects will be initiated. This will create a possibility for Finland to join 
in. However, the participation of Finland in Arctic activities is affected by existing or emerging 
tensions and disputes in this area. For now, it seems as if the biggest risks to the equilibrium 
in the area are posed by disputes related to navigation in the Arctic and the ownership rights 
over the seabed. 
 
If the price of oil stays low for a prolonged period, various societal and political risks will 
increase in Russia, and the importance of Finland’s own preparedness will become more 
pronounced. Within energy policy, cooperation within the nuclear power sector will probably 
not face significant change, but Finland should prepare for substituting its oil and gas 
provision. Russia’s European markets are shrinking. The choices of decision-makers need to 
be supported by long-term research on the key processes of the Russian economy and 
society and the actual influence of various interest groups. Finnish solutions need to take into 
account the contradictions of Russian developmental trends, and Finland has to strive to 
maintain its own response readiness for different situations. 
3.2 Russia’s external security 
Objectives and resources 
In recent years, the central objective of Russia has been to gain recognition as a great power 
in international decision-making. However, foreign policy objectives have also been linked 
with a realpolitik understanding of the economic advantages that are ultimately defended 
through military presence and action. Russia aims for a multipolar international system; in a 
global framework, it shares this objective with China. Simultaneously, Russia aims to gain 
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influence in former Soviet areas or countries with which it has a cultural and historical link. A 
central objective of Russia is to prevent so-called colour revolutions near its border. Concrete 
focal sectors in Russian foreign policy include global energy exports, international 
antiterrorism action, the development of the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Arctic, among 
others. Within external security, Russia strives to build strategically and tactically beneficial 
ally relations on both political and economic shared interests. Increased activities with China 
serve as an example. 
 
Russia’s goal is to achieve actual recognition or de facto acceptance for its current 
interpretation of sovereignty. Previously, Russia has harboured a sceptical attitude towards 
humanitarian interventions, since they have been interpreted as interfering with state 
sovereignty. From Russia’s perspective, Western interventions have justified practically 
military activity. A similar view is reflected in Russian attitudes towards integration 
endeavours which the EU has implemented in Eastern European states, and in a categorical 
rejection of activities it deems as interfering with its internal issues. Maintaining strategic 
independence in all cooperation is at the centre of Russian foreign policy thinking. Russia 
compares itself to the status of the United States, which according to Russia’s impression is, 
as a superpower, above international norms and law. (Igumnova 2011.) From Russia’s 
perspective, its actions in Ukraine and the Crimea, which it partially justified with 
humanitarian causes, were a demonstration of its strengthened role and ability to set 
boundaries for the actions of other parties when these are deemed to seriously threaten 
Russian national interests. As Russia categorically opposes the expansion of NATO near its 
border, it interprets that the annexing of the Crimea was also a defensive action due to the 
military importance of the area. Russian participation in the Syria crisis, for its part, is justified, 
among other activity, by international antiterrorism activity, in which a great power is also 
active outside its own borders. 
 
The United Nations has been an important political resource for Russia to further its foreign 
policy goals. A crucial resource in Russia–EU relations has been Russian energy exports to 
Europe and cooperation within the energy sector. Global energy exporting includes acting as 
a great power within the nuclear power sector. From a European perspective, the Russian 
markets were attractive until the events in the Crimea in 2014. Lively cultural, scientific and 
education cooperation has also built relations between Russia and Europe. These have not 
been directly affected by the current crisis. 
Russia’s ability to achieve its goals 
Russia’s credibility in the United Nations, for instance, is based on its actual ability to 
participate in solving regional conflicts. In its attempts to achieve its objectives, Russia, as a 
superpower, has to address the question of what political and economic risks it is ready to 
take in implementing its foreign and security policy. However, Russia’s capacity cannot be 
explained with one factor. What is essential is that Russia can execute its own objectives 
more quickly than NATO or the EU. Russia is also more agile in hybrid influencing. 
 
The implications of the sanctions are both economic and political. The sanctions include 
several limitations on economic cooperation, such as long-term credit for Russian banks, 
energy companies and the military industry, as well as Arctic and offshore energy technology 
exports to Russia, and arms exports. The sanctions also restrict Russia’s participation in 
multilateral cooperation, such as G8 cooperation (Aalto & Forsberg 2015: 223), the EU–
Russia council and the Russia–NATO council. Persons related to Russian decision-making 
have been put on a travel ban and their foreign accounts have been frozen. The dialogue 
between the West and Russia has been weak or non-existent, and juxtaposition is increasing. 
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In this situation, Russia has sought to further its foreign policy through bilateral relations, 
which already had a significant role before the crisis. In the European Union, Germany and 
France act as the ‘political resources’ of Russia. Financial support from Russia to European 
right-wing politicians is significant,
18
 through which it also strengthens its political relations 
with central European countries. Russia is skilled at utilising international law for expanding 
its own latitude by emphasising how it is open to various interpretations. It justifies its 
activities by creating analogues to the United States. Russian foreign policy can be seen as 
tactically flexible. Russia participates in various international policy ‘games’, in which its own 
foreign policy doctrine is implemented with a varying emphasis. 
 
The development of the Eurasian Economic Union, which officially started its activities at the 
beginning of 2015, faces various economic, administrative, legislative and political 
challenges. A crucial issue is whether Russia will succeed at combining the Silk Road policy 
of China and the goals of the Eurasian Economic Union, which were agreed in principle in 
spring 2014. Russia will probably actively pursue this goal, particularly if its relations with the 
West continue to deteriorate or remain inflamed. In the sphere of influence battle with China, 
Russia seeks to avoid a zero-sum game. After several years of negotiations, the countries 
have signed energy agreements. China’s influence on Russian politics and society will 
probably increase. An example of this is the restriction of Internet usage, which was planned 
in collaboration with Prime Minister Medvedev and the Chinese. Like the Caucasus, Central 
Asia is important for Russia in regard to antiterrorism. However, sanctions imposed by the 
United States on specific persons undermine the ability of Russia to participate in 
international crime prevention activity alongside the United States.
19
 
 
The problems of the Russian national economy are significantly slowing down an escalation 
of the Ukrainian crisis. For this reason, it is probable that the Ukrainian crisis will come to a 
halt at some point. The European Union is still important for Russia, as the EU stands for 
40 per cent of its trade, whereas Russia only represents six per cent of average EU trade. 
The current diversification activities are forced and time-consuming. Russian economic 
development is still heavily dependent on the overproduction of fossil fuels. According to 
current estimates, its economic development can generate an annual growth of around 1–
2 per cent, which is very low compared to Russia’s economic development of the past 
decade. Its business environment is still not particularly attractive. Solid investments 
decreased by 2.6 per cent in 2014, and by 8.5 per cent in 2015.
20
 
 
As to the assessments of foreign scholars, a first group of analysts predict dire 
consequences for the Russian economy [...] Some note that the impact of the 
sanctions depends on whether Russia’s former partners can maintain these in 
the long run at potentially increasing costs [...] Others believe that the impact 
of the sanctions may remain limited, noting that the Russian state is highly 
resilient because the many non-globalised sectors of its economy co-exist with 
more export-dependent sectors, such as energy, which are protected by 
Russia’s Reserve Fund. [..] Russia can withstand major economic losses in 
the short to medium run, while both the elite and society at large are likely to 
rally behind President Putin’s countermeasures to the sanctions. (Aalto & 
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Forsberg 2015, The Structuration of Russia’s Geo-Economy Under Economic 
Sanctions.) 
 
All in all, Russia’s foreign policy development is nevertheless not inevitable. If the Russian 
economy continues to decline, Russia might lean politically more towards the East. The 
current economic capacity of the Eurasian Economic Union will not further the recovery or 
growth of Russian resources in the short term, but the union has to be seen as a long-term 
strategic key project. China wants free access to the area of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(Dutkiewicz 2015). Cooperation with China also has domestic policy implications, as the 
influence of China grows within the Russian economy and society. However, the countries 
also share important foreign and trade policy goals. Both China and Russia see the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) as an instrument for a battle of 
spheres of influence, and therefore oppose it. For now, China is primarily important for 
Russia because of crude oil and armaments imports. 
 
So-called soft power, through culture, education and research relations, is also important for 
Russia, and Russia has invested in education exports in former Soviet areas. The 2014 
Olympics were loaded with expectations of how it would serve as an international PR 
campaign, as a window on the ‘new Russia’. This goal was hindered by events related to 
legislative changes in Russia, which were broadly reported and discussed in the Western 
media. Russia has interpreted Western criticism as part of a systematic information war 
aimed at isolating Russia in international relations. So far, the chances of Russia restoring its 
international reputation seem weak, unless the Ukrainian crisis takes a significantly different 
turn. 
Implications for Finland 
The current crisis situation in Europe is a stress test for Finland, which points out the weak 
links in our administrative system, among others. Finland has harboured a picture of itself as 
a model country: as a Nordic welfare state, whose activities are well organised. The current 
situation has, however, proved that the limited nature of the administrative resources are 
becoming visible, and cooperation between authorities is not always as smooth as was 
thought. 
 
The EU sanctions have taken their economic toll on Finnish agriculture. Prior to 2014, there 
were great expectations for Russian trade, and Russia was deemed a central partner in the 
economic development of Finland. In the current situation, Finland supports maintaining unity 
within the EU in regard to the sanctions. However, Finland must also prepare itself for the 
post-sanctions era. If the conditions of the Minsk Agreement are sufficiently met, some of the 
sanctions will possibly be dismantled. If, for instance, Germany proposes lifting the EU 
sanctions, Finland will probably support such a proposition. The social and economic 
advantages for Finland are large enough for there to be enough political support for 
dissolving the sanctions. Nevertheless, Finland must develop its agricultural exports further; 
Russia cannot be relied upon as it could previously. 
 
The information war between the East and the West is so comprehensive that compiling a 
realistic picture from single events and their interpretations in the media is difficult. 
Throughout the whole of Finnish society, Finnish decision-makers are required to exercise 
independent thinking and to be critical towards information sources. Future research on 
Russian security and foreign policy goals should increasingly strive to support the formation 
of a more comprehensive and comparable picture of Russian decision-making, goals and 
realised development. 
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For the Finnish government and parliament, it is important to follow Russia’s Transatlantic 
and trans-Asian relations. The development in the Arctic can provide opportunities for 
Finland. Finland’s goal should be to prevent an increase in tension and to maintain peace in 
the competition regarding national interests. The development of the Eurasian Economic 
Union as well as the broader development of Central Asia will also have an impact on 
Finland. If the states of this region escalate into a state of ferment, this can be reflected in 
Finland in the form of weakened border security, allowing, for example, illegal migration or 
transnational crime, of which drug trafficking to Russia and Europe is the most significant. 
Finland’s goal should be to maintain and systematically strengthen cooperation with Russia’s 
authorities. 
 
Environmental issues have been a central aspect of the foreign policy interaction between 
Russia and Finland – a sector in which efforts have led to significant results, as well. This 
sector should also be invested in in the future, and during the sanctions, Finland should also 
strive towards a political solution in which cooperation within the energy sector is not critically 
undermined. 
3.3 Russia’s internal security 
Objectives and resources 
The strategic long-term goal of Russia’s internal security has been to adapt to the economic 
constraints brought on by globalisation by stabilising its macro-economy and by reforming 
Russian state services by utilising also globalized means of the public sector. Concrete 
measures have included improving capabilities in the economic and social policy 
implementation, influencing the demographic situation through family, health and immigration 
policy, and reforming crime prevention activities and legislation. In addition, strengthening 
political consensus, cultural unity and acknowledging traditional values in the legislation and 
implementation of policy reforms are seen to support internal security goals. Central strategic 
means in state governance have included centralisation and an authoritarian, election-based 
model. While the financing for security administration has increased, social policy is still the 
most central focus point in internal security. Currently, it represents up to 35 per cent of the 
national economy expenditure and 13–14 per cent of the GDP (Korhonen V. 2016). 
 
National security 
 
Behind the formation of Russia’s objectives lie two developmental lines, which have grown 
stronger during the past 15 years. After the post-Soviet crisis years, which culminated in the 
crash of the rouble in 1998, national security has developed into a central frame for public 
policy planning. The goal has been that the President-led Security Council of Russian 
Federation would act as the core of planning activities. It would take a broad stand on both 
external and internal security issues and set the order of priority among them. 
 
Central leadership-related objectives have included the establishment of a strong central 
government through the so-called power vertical. In addition to the aim of focusing power in 
Moscow, the goal has been to improve the planning and control of practical reform work, 
partially by implementing international public sector techniques. The goals of internal security 
are defined in the Security Strategy, and their implementation is also regulated in the Security 
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Law.
21
 Another concrete goal has been to reform public governance and administrative 
systems. 
 
Since national security has been established as the guiding principle for public policy, the 
relation between international judicial norms and institutions has also undergone a change, 
as Russian sovereignty has been emphasised. Sovereignty and the willingness to integrate 
new kinds of judicial thinking into Russian legislation have been a topic of discussion ever 
since the constitutional reform of 1993. President Putin’s rule cannot unequivocally be 
regarded as opposing the development of the Rule of Law. During his first presidential term, 
a number of reforms that significantly improved basic rights were enacted in the fields of 
criminal law and criminal procedural law, among others (Kahn 2008). Russia has been 
diligent in conforming with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding 
payments, albeit without institutional changes in Russia (Van der Vet 2014). 
 
In recent years, there has, however, been a notable shift in Russia’s attitude towards foreign 
jurisprudence. Decisions of international courts of human rights are not automatically deemed 
binding in Russia. The principle of sovereignty is more broadly applied in the drafting and 
implementation of legislation. The attitudes of Supreme Court judges also seem to be 
changing in regard to sovereignty, national security and human rights. 
 
[Unlike] the 2003 Decree, the 2013 Supreme Court Decree views ECtHR 
jurisprudence only as complementary to domestic Russian legislation and 
treaties: “legal positions” (pravovye pozitsii) of the European Court need to be 
“taken into consideration” (uchityvaiutsia) when applying Russian legislation 
and treaties of the Russian Federation in the courts of general jurisdiction. 
(Antonov 2014, Conservatism in Russia and Sovereignty in Human Rights) 
 
Legal developments and the pronounced role of the Security Council are also strengthening 
the so-called securitisation of the political steering in Russia. This refers to a situation where, 
in addition to comprehensive security thinking, practical steering in the actual implementation 
is increased. Such measures have traditionally been taken in use when undesired 
consequences of reforms have posed a serious political risk for the entire reform (Heusala 
2013). The basic challenge for Russian domestic policy is indeed how far political and 
administrative centralisation can be taken in the name of more efficient leadership and 
national security. 
Nevertheless, in internal security, social responsibility thinking is still central. The task of the 
state is to provide social basic services, which legitimates the political system. This is also 
reflected in the indicators of the Security Strategy, in which welfare-related issues are well 
represented. Patriotism, great power foreign policy and globalisation are intertwined in 
Russia’s internal security goals. Russia is investing in the development of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, where the unification of immigration policy, economic policy and labour 
policy in the member states is brought up on the political agenda. Immigration policy is 
indeed among the high-priority issues in Russian security thinking, since it is related to the 
creation of free labour markets among the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(Kangaspuro & Heusala 2017). 
 
Until recent years, the macroeconomic stabilisation policy and the accumulation of reserve 
funds have been the most important resources in the development of Russia’s internal 
security. In the current situation, the importance of national unity is emphasised. This is 
                                                     
21
 Федеральные закон от 28 декабря 2010 г. N 390-ФЗ "О безопасности". 
  
 41 
 
furthered through the media, among others, and is used for strengthening the political 
steering of decision-making as well as for averting opposition movements. Strong support for 
the measures of the current political lead is understood as a prerequisite for goals related to 
turning the course of the economy, such as the import substitution programme. 
 
Structural changes in public administration as well as efforts to improve its functional 
capacity, including complementary training and partial digitalisation of services, have also 
aimed at generating a change in the administrative culture. However, the change in the 
Russian administration can only be regarded as a process in progress, finances for which 
were only available during the economic boom of the 2000s. Regarding administrative 
systems in internal security, law enforcement organisations, in particular, have undergone 
several structural reforms. The latest reform of 2016 is about unifying and transferring the 
forces operating under the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the President-led National Guard
22
. 
This move has been explained as attempt to strengthen public order during a state of 
emergency and counterterrorism activities, in particular.
23
 The Drug control agency and the 
Immigration agency have also been integrated as part of the structure of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, albeit under the principle that they retain their autonomy.
24
 In other words, 
within Russian internal security, the administrative structure is accommodated to the political 
leaders’ assessment of changes in the security environment. 
 
Russia’s ability to achieve its goals 
The strong characteristics of the Soviet administrative culture, the economic solutions of the 
1990s, as well as general challenges related to the large changes within the public sector, 
such as the partial or failed implementation of reforms, have posed challenges for the 
reformation of Russia. Support for centralisation has been remarkably large in Russia, since 
memories of the chaotic 1990s and unpaid wages have not faded. During the long economic 
growth period, the implementation of long-term strategic thinking, macroeconomic 
stabilisation and the restructuring of the administration was feasible. There was also some 
improvement in the legal protection of citizens, as their chances of succeeding in legal 
actions against the authorities improved. Russia was able to implement large structural 
reforms; for instance, in 2004, the number of ministries, central committees and commissions 
was reduced in the reform of the central government, and the first phase of the still ongoing 
tax reform took place in 2000–2004. 
 
In the current situation, public sector reforms occur partially under duress, similarly to the 
1990s. The 10 per cent drop in real wages in 2015 (Korhonen I. 2016), unemployment and 
worsened living conditions burden political decision-making and restrict its latitude. In 2015, 
consumer spending dropped around 9 per cent due to the drop in real wages, according to 
the Central Bank of Russia. Simultaneously, 2.3 million people plunged below the poverty 
line. Unemployment has been addressed by cutting wages and working hours, while migrant 
workers have simultaneously disappeared from the Russian cash-in-hand labour market due 
to the weakened rouble.
25
 The inflation estimate for 2016 has been around 8 per cent. 
Nominal increases in the public sector have been restricted or frozen as of 2014. Increases in 
pensions have decreased from the usual 13 per cent to 4 per cent, and there are plans to 
raise the retirement age. (Korhonen V. 2016.) 
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Military economic Keynesianism is thus not merely an economically stimulating development, 
since Russia will have to make short-term choices between welfare state obligations and 
developing the military industry, and the resuscitating effect from the military industry will not 
be visible immediately. The effect may also require changing the entire structure of the 
economy as well as the foundation of Russian security thinking. However, Russia is not ready 
for a night-watchman state model, since welfare services are a central legitimating factor for 
political activities and a central part of security thinking, where the security of the individual is 
guaranteed by the state. 
 
State reforms 
 
The actual decision-making ability of a so-called hybrid system like Russia’s has been 
interpreted by researchers in various ways. Academics often emphasise that there are no 
time- or institution-related restrictions in a centralized system, meaning decisions can be 
made without prior lengthy negotiations, and also by taking risks. Then again, researchers 
also stress the slowness and rigidity of decision-making, corruption, resilient characteristic of 
the administrative culture, pedantic legalism on the one hand and contingent interpretation 
and implementation of the law on the other. 
The symbiosis of the informal neopatrimonial “core” and the formal shell which 
outwardly seems to share features with advanced states and markets, ranging 
from legally independent courts to the commercial operations of state-owned 
companies [...], maintains a stable yet inefficient equilibrium. (Gel’man 2015, 
The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia.) 
There are thus various interpretations regarding state reforms and the ability of Russia to 
carry them through. The normative foundation of the reforms are often well-prepared in the 
sense that the content of central documents are coordinated. Their implementation faces 
numerous challenges. (Monaghan 2014.) Plans can be derailed during large crises, such as 
during the economic crisis of 2008–2009. The legislation itself, as well as rules for 
implementation, may include significant holes and flaws. Strategy 2020 serves as an 
example: in over 400 pages, there is not a single section dealing with a vision on national 
industry policy. (Gurova & Ivanter 2012.) Last, but not least, challenges also include the 
know-how of the authorities, the poor respect for the work of the authorities and poor 
commitment of authorities, difficulties in developing incentive systems and efficiency 
indicators, unrealistic goals, constant reforms, vague instructions, and strong opposition to 
reforms within the administration (Monaghan 2014; Oleinik 2009; Goncharov & Shirikov 2013; 
Heusala 2013; Ledyayev 2009). 
Post-Soviet political regimes represent multiple varieties of authoritarianism, 
both “hegemonic” and “electoral” [..] Post-Soviet market reforms contributed to 
the rise of patrimonial “crony capitalism,” which is based upon ruling groups’ 
political control over key economic assets and economic actors [..] The quality 
of governance in Russia and other post-Soviet states is much poorer than one 
might expect given their degree of socioeconomic development [..] (Gel’man 
2015, The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia) 
 
What we have seen in Russia under Putin, it will be argued below, can be 
understood as a transformation from a “competing-pyramid” system where 
multiple regional and corporate patronage pyramids actively competed for 
support to a “single-pyramid” system where the president has effectively 
combined the most important lower-level patronal networks into one large 
nationwide political machine. This is very different from saying that Russia has 
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become an authoritarian state since a political machine, even a very large 
nationwide political machine, behaves in ways that are quite distinct from 
authoritarianism so long as it does not end elections in which at least some 
real opposition is allowed to compete. (Hale 2010, Eurasian Polities as Hybrid 
Regimes: The Case of Putin’s Russia.) 
Demographic development and regional policy 
 
Increasing birth rates has been one of the central goals of Russian social policy, but the 
reasons behind low mortality have only recently been addressed. In demographic security 
thinking, Russia follows the example of the United States and Canada in issues related to 
birth rates, among others. Only a successful combination of a pronatalist social security 
system and a social and health policy programme seeking to decrease the very high mortality 
rate can reverse the decrease in the Russian population. Even in the best case scenario, the 
impact of the 1990s will be seen in population development in the 2040s, as the small 
generation of the children of parents born in the 1990s will reach the age of family formation 
(RANEPA 2015: 120). Issues related to changing living habits and developing the health care 
system will pose a challenge for the realisation of Russia’s demographic goals. 
 
While Russia’s leaders claim to have facilitated a “miracle” in welfare 
provision, an examination of the budget numbers shows that overall welfare 
spending has not increased as much as general budget outlays. Because 
there is little room for NGO or trade union involvement in decision-making, 
policies support state interests rather than those of the broader society. For 
example, Russian leaders have concentrated resources on raising the 
birthrate and increasing pensions rather than addressing the pressing issue of 
high male mortality. Paradoxically, however, in some cases, NGOs initiate the 
provision of new kinds of services, such as for AIDS patients, which are then 
taken over by the state. Federalism is important since there is wide variation 
across regions in social welfare provision. Ultimately, Russia’s welfare policies 
are neither purely statist nor neo-liberal since the state is expanding its role in 
some areas, while shedding responsibilities in others. (Kulmala, Kainu, Nikula 
& Kivinen 2014, Paradoxes of Agency: Democracy and Welfare in Russia.) 
 
Regional development in Russia has been a challenge since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and to this day, the situation still reflects many other political solutions. There is significant 
regional variation in implementation in Russian regional policy. It can be said that there are 
regions in Russia where life resembles Switzerland, but also other regions where 
development has come to a halt and even dropped to the level of developing countries. The 
Soviet legacy is visible in the regions’ own economic and social goals and resources. Putin’s 
economic and social policy, which is implemented by regional administrations, has been 
successful in reducing everyday crime. In this sense, the everyday life of the people has 
improved. However, there are differences in how the regions are able to maintain their 
economies. The central government also supports regions in accordance with security 
thinking by strengthening unity, e.g., in Chechnya. In Murmansk, infrastructure has been 
improved through road-building. As economic power has been delegated, the authoritative 
decision-making culture of the regions has grown stronger, which can be considered a 
paradox of administrative reform. While, for instance, Chechnya has been supported, its 
political-institutional development has been weak from a liberal-democratic perspective. 
Currently, 75 per cent of all budget financing goes through the central government. The 
economically weak are subsidised from Moscow, which does not necessarily encourage the 
regions to take independent responsibility for their development, but continues to support 
nonviable communities. Simultaneously, the system also relies on semiformal agreements 
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between enterprises and local administrations. This serves as a new form of the tradition of 
industrial communities built around one company. The communal responsibility of companies 
is hence an important political lever in Russian regional policy. 
 
Administrative systems and information security 
 
Organisational changes and legislative reforms within immigration policy are continuing, as 
are rivalling political goals (Abashin 2017). Authority resources within internal security had 
been increased before the current crisis, and institutions were the targets of reform. For 
instance, there were significant expectations of the reform of police forces, and resources 
markedly improved during the 2000s. However, it has been challenging to change the 
organisational culture, even though personnel at the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been 
replaced and increased in the recent reforms. (Heusala & Koistinen 2016.) Economic 
difficulties probably increase crime rates as unemployment increases, which hampers the 
cultural reform of the law-enforcement organisations, challenging to begin with. This might 
lead to stronger ‘law and order’ thinking. The economic crisis might also affect the technical 
reform of authority operations; for instance, the possible digitalisation of border security has 
been delayed. 
 
The establishment of the new National Guard has provoked conflicting opinions both in 
Russia and abroad. Some representatives of the Russian authorities have concluded that the 
power of the National Guard overlaps with the power of other organisations, such as the 
Federal Security Service (FSB). It has therefore been hoped that it would concentrate on 
fighting radical terrorism. Some political commentators have seen the National Guard as a 
result of the crisis of the current leadership and as a preparatory measure for the 
consequences of unpopular economic and public policy decisions. An assessment has also 
been voiced that the Russian leaders are preparing for a coup from within the public 
administration by centralising the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directly under the 
President. The Russian Presidential government has denied this interpretation.
26
 The 
accuracy of these estimates will, however, only be revealed as the actual focal points of the 
activities of the new organisation are formed. 
 
Counterterrorism and crime prevention activities show signs of international cooperation as 
well as a protective attitude to Russian legislation and sovereignty. The weakened 
international atmosphere has also had unintended implications. In counter-narcotics, the 
economic sanctions have led to a halt in the cooperation between Russia and the United 
States.
27
 Chechnya will also be a critical region in Russian security policy in the future. In 
addition, Russian citizens who have participated in the Syrian combat increase the pressure 
of authority activity in fighting extremist action within Russia. 
 
Legal and information security tendencies will remain central in the development of internal 
security. The reform of Russian law has faced increasing challenges, and the implementation 
of laws has become more selective. Another issue related to the development of legal 
security is the pressure to control access to information, which strives to control the Internet 
(similarly to China), as a defence measure. The Russian state has the capacity to seize 
complete control over the Internet in Russia, thus controlling both political activity and foreign 
information and communication within the borders of Russia. Russia will continue to develop 
its own information warfare and test its systems. 
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Implications for Finland 
Russian internal security in accordance with its security strategy is important for Finland as a 
whole. Internal security thus encompasses the following themes: regional policy, immigration 
policy, counter-extremism activities, counter-narcotics activities, nationality policy, border 
security and information security. These are also related to changes in Russian legislation 
and state reforms, as well as the actual development of daily legal culture and Russian 
authorities. It is in Finland’s interest to consider the concrete cooperation between sectoral 
ministries, which has been going on for a long time, and for our foreign policy leaders’ 
relations with Russia. Concrete cross-border interaction between authorities can reduce 
tension over spheres of influence and, at best, form a realistic picture of the relationship 
between Russian institutions and Russian politics. 
For Finland, it is important to know how regional capacities are developing in health policy, 
particularly in regions near our borders. Antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis and HIV infections 
are also possible risks for the Finnish health care system. Finland should therefore strive to 
continue cross-border cooperation in social and health policy issues, even though they 
currently depend on Russia’s choices. Finland should also try and keep health issues beyond 
the scope of ‘securitisation’ on a political level. 
In legal developments, Finland should be prepared for rapid and abrupt changes and 
increasing risks due to ‘securitisation’. The impact of Russian state reforms for Finland 
depends on the case. For Finnish companies, strict regulation and at times unpredictable 
authority control cause additional expenses. There is also cooperation in other sectors, of 
which the most important are border security and crime prevention activities. The long 
established cooperation should be systematically developed through long-term goals, despite 
the current political crisis. It is in Finland’s interest to gain high-level Russian political support 
for the development ideas coming from the professionals in these fields. 
Russia’s demographic development and immigration may also inflict pressure on Finland. It is 
therefore important to continue the systematic monitoring and analysis of the Russian 
immigration situation. If Russian border security fails, there is a risk that there will be a 
broader migration pressure on Finland or elsewhere on Europe through Finland. In 
monitoring border security, it is good to separate the political level and daily activities of 
authorities. Concrete activities of authorities at the local level involve challenges that are 
beyond political control, such as human trafficking and related corruption. 
Regarding information security, increased Russian isolation from the rest of the world is 
possible, and Finland should also be prepared for tightened legislation regarding the Internet. 
In regional policy, the most critical phase from the perspective of Finland occurred in the 
1990s, when there was a genuine possibility that Russia would disintegrate. Subsequently, 
the central government has been able to strengthen legislative, political and administrative 
stability through centralisation. Deliberately enforcing patriotism was also used for furthering 
consensus, and has indeed been a successful strategy throughout the political field. 
Patriotism may generate initiatives and changes that lead to limiting the rights of minorities, 
e.g., in Karelia. 
For a country neighbouring Russia like Finland, it is important to take the development of 
Russian strategic (long-term) thinking into account, as well as monitoring the planning and 
implementation of economic policy, in particular. However, poor knowledge of Russian 
political decision-making among Finnish decision-makers will also pose a challenge for future 
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interactions. The informal characteristics of Russian decision-making processes and the 
unreliability of information regarding these processes easily lead to Finnish decision-makers 
listening to only a few experts and interest groups. The lack of comprehensive analysis blurs 
the average evaluation regarding the activities of Russian administration and representative 
organisations. This leads to a tendency to overemphasise individual events, which dismisses 
Russian long-term development and systematic policy analysis that does not focus on day-to-
day politics. A longer perspective would also help to lessen approximate and personified 
estimates of the Russian leadership. All in all, Finland must also tend to its economic 
interests in the future. Shared interests within internal security should be furthered and kept 
outside the influence of increased international tension as far as possible. This will enable the 
addressing and development of numerous day-to-day issues. 
In a broader perspective, cooperation in fighting global security threats, environmental 
problems and global crime (financial and drug-related crime and human trafficking) should 
also be the central goals in the Finnish government’s Russian cooperation in the future. 
Counterterrorism is also among the themes in which Finland should strive for the necessary 
cooperation with Russia. These issues are not only questions of national security, but of 
global security, in which borders between spheres of influence are blurred. In terms of 
environmental policy, Finnish nuclear power policy is based on different advantages than 
those of many other EU member states. This tension will pose challenges within the EU in 
the future. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Developing research on Russian security policy 
The project sought to map how Finnish studies conducted in 2011–2015 are related to the 
social and public policy categories in accordance with the Russian national security 
definitions. From a total of 2,200 publications, 461 publications that fit the classification of 
peer-reviewed scientific publications used by the Ministry of Education and Culture (see 
page 10) were selected for the sample. 
Many themes of Russian national security have been insufficiently researched in Finland. In 
order to develop research, Finland must establish a strategy for research on Russian security 
policy. The starting point must be basic research on an international level. The strategy 
should include the following themes: 
 Critical research topics, which include 
o the military industry as a part of Russian public policy, 
o the armed forces, 
o the Russian security authorities, security legislation and security 
leadership, 
o Russian law, 
o internal security (border security, terrorism and counterterrorism, 
transnational crime, financial crime, immigration policy), 
o religious communities in Russia and traditional values, 
o the Eurasian Economic Union as a part of Russian economic and 
security policy, 
o the Arctic as a part of Russian economic and security policy, 
o information security, 
o the planning and implementation of Russian legislation and policy 
programmes, and 
o global international relations of Russia, particularly in Asia. 
 
 Finland should rely on good international networks particularly in research on global 
international relations, the Arctic, the Eurasian Economic Union and terrorism. 
 
 A cluster for academic research on security policy and comprehensive security. The 
objective should be to ensure sufficient funds for the selected focal areas for 
development, in order to establish long-term research groups and education. Short-
term financing can be utilised, but not as main funding. The activities of the cluster 
should be supported by good international networks. The cluster should be based on 
two permanent professorships, of which one is a military professorship. In addition, in 
the near future, the cluster should include two long-term posts (3- and 5-year posts) 
as well as 2–3 doctoral students. 
 Cooperation mechanisms between the academic world and the authorities should be 
developed in order to ensure input from public administration to academia. The 
RussiaHUB Helsinki concept offers a good starting point for this purpose. 
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Development of national security in Russia 
The purpose of our project was to establish what the most central Russian development 
trends are, and examine what these potentially mean for Finland. The development trends in 
Russian national security were considered in two international workshops during spring 2016. 
The workshops were based on specific themes and related questions, which were given to 
the participants in advance. In total, eight academic experts and two experts from the Ministry 
of Defence participated in the workshops. Development trends in Russian national security 
were evaluated in regard to Russia’s goals and resources and its ability to achieve its goals. 
Central trends are related to the following issues, among others: 
 Russian national security has developed into a central frame for public policy 
planning and implementation, and maintaining a strong central government is 
important in leading the Russian administration. The goal of economic development 
is the intensification of planning and a high-technology military economy, which at 
best would serve as a motor for economic development and growth and support 
other public policy goals. While the financing for security administration has 
increased and Russia continues to develop its administrative system, social policy is 
still the most central focus in internal security. 
 Leading a country involves balancing between the economic conditions brought on 
by globalisation and state-provided services through a hybrid system. Russia will 
have to make short-term choices between welfare state obligations and developing 
the military industry, and the resuscitating effect from the military industry will not be 
visible immediately. The current diversification activities are time-consuming, and 
Russian economic development is still heavily dependent on the overproduction of 
fossil fuels. 
 The relation between international judicial norms and institutions has undergone a 
change, as the principle of sovereignty is more broadly applied in the drafting and 
implementation of legislation. Russia’s foreign policy goal is to achieve actual 
recognition or de facto acceptance for its current interpretation of sovereignty. In this, 
the United States is the main point of comparison. 
 
 National unity and traditional values have been established as official goals in the 
Security Strategy. Unity is used for strengthening the political steering of decision-
making as well as for averting opposition movements. 
 Russia aims for a multipolar international system, in which it is recognised as one of 
the actors in the international system in various contexts. Russia looks to the BRICS 
countries, China in particular, as a counterforce against US influence. 
 
 The Russian concept of the sphere of influence extends particularly to former Soviet 
regions or countries with which it has a cultural and historical link. Russia strives to 
build strategically and tactically beneficial ally relations on both political and 
economic shared interests. 
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When evaluating Russia’s implementation capacity, the following factors need to be taken 
into account: 
 Russia’s capacity cannot be explained with one factor only, and Russian foreign 
policy will not necessarily develop along one path. Too simplistic indicators should be 
avoided when Russia’s ability to achieve its goals is evaluated. Russia’s ability to 
implement its strategies for achieving its defence and economic objectives is 
currently undermined by the price development of oil. If the Russian economy 
continues to decline, Russia might lean more towards the East. The import 
substitution policy will take time, but Russia can also carry out long-term strategic 
plans. 
 Russia can execute its own objectives more quickly than NATO or the EU. Russia 
will respond to NATO’s missile defence project. Its central goals include protecting 
Russia’s economic and political interests in the Arctic and the long-term development 
of the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia categorically rejects activities it deems to be 
interfering with or influencing its internal issues, such as political or nongovernmental 
activities with foreign funding or so-called colour revolutions near its border. The 
eastern expansion of NATO and the EU is seen as a containment strategy. 
 
 Russia is not ready for a night-watchman state model, at least not yet, since welfare 
services are a main legitimating factor for the political system and a central part of 
security thinking. State-guaranteed security of individuals is at the core of Russian 
security thinking.  
 
 Concrete internal security goals have included improving the economic and social 
policy implementation capacity of regions, influencing the demographic situation 
through family, health and immigration policy, and reforming crime prevention 
activities and legislation. The current economic crisis is very problematic for all of 
Russia’s goals, as living standards deteriorate and actual unemployment increases. 
The impact of the EU sanctions on reserve funds is experienced as an attack against 
national security. 
Finland’s choices 
 Finland must take into account the development of Russian long-term strategic 
development and monitor the implementation of strategic programmes regarding 
both the economy and the Russian administration. It is important that decision-
makers discern those areas of development which Russia uses to formulate its 
strategic decisions. Finland’s own choices should not be based on absolute 
evaluations or analyses regarding only current situations. 
 Finland should support its Russian policies and research by developing a strategy for 
research on Russian security policy and by establishing a research cluster. Activities 
should be based on the systematic development of academic international-level 
expertise. It is crucial to focus on critical, yet little or not at all researched themes. 
 From Finland’s perspective, it is important to maintain the possibility of continuing 
economic collaboration, particularly if or when the current crisis eases up. 
Evaluations of Russia should be field- or sector-based. Nevertheless, Finland must 
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develop its agricultural exports further; Russia cannot be relied upon as it was 
previously. 
 It is in Finland’s interest to consider concrete cooperation between sector ministries, 
which has been going on for a long time, and for our foreign policy leaders’ relations 
with Russia. Concrete authority interaction can reduce the tension in the spheres of 
interest and, at best, also form a realistic picture of the relationship between Russian 
institutions and Russian politics. 
 Finland should monitor and, as far as possible, be active in the following issues: 
o The immigration situation in Russia and Russian authority systems. 
o Health policy, particularly in neighbouring areas. 
o Legal developments, in which Finland should also be prepared for rapid 
changes and increased risks in Russia. 
o Border security, where cooperation should be systematically developed 
through long-term goals despite the current political crisis. 
o The crime situation in Russia and the development of authority systems. In 
crime prevention activities, development ideas from the professionals should 
receive political support. 
o Information security, in which Finland should also be prepared for increased 
legislative control. 
 Cooperation within the nuclear power sector will probably not face significant change, 
but Finland should prepare for substituting its oil and gas provision. Increases in oil 
prices will further the initiation of Arctic energy projects, which might create 
opportunities for Finland to join in. 
 Throughout the whole of Finnish society, Finnish decision-makers are required to 
exercise independent thinking and to be critical towards information sources. The 
current crisis situation in Europe is a stress test for Finland, which points out the 
weak links in our political and administrative system, among others. This report has 
outlined some concrete suggestions for the situation, but the work must be 
continued. 
 The future of Europe cannot be based on permanent juxtaposition. However, Finland 
should be prepared for various developmental courses and be flexible and quick in its 
own actions. This would also mean increased defence and internal security 
expenditure. 
 Finland should elevate global security challenges to the core of its cooperation with 
Russia. In global challenges, the scale rises above battles over spheres of influence 
and zero-sum games. Global challenges include the state of the environment, the 
impact of immigration, various forms of transnational crime and the structural change 
in societies due to digitalisation. Cooperation in the most crucial global challenge – 
namely, climate change – should be emphasised, and Finland should strive towards 
practical research and technological cooperation. 
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